Avers your good self:
>I doubt that science can settle all moral disputes but it certainly could
>settle
>some, and often when it cannot settle them it is because there is not
>sufficient
>scientific evidence or at least evidence that parties can agree upon. Just to
>give an example.
>Some people claim we ought not plant GM modified canola resistant to
>glysophate
>because they believe that it will result in cross-pollination of related weed
>species, such as wild mustard, and there will then be weeds also resistant to
>this non-specific herbicide. Research by Canada Agriculture
>gives some evidence that this will not happen but the evidence is
>certainly not
>all in. However, if a person objected to GM modified canola solely on this
>ground
>then at least in principle the issue could be solved
>through science. I am sure there are many moral issues of this type.
This strikes me as a scientific dispute from the off, Ken! The embedded moral stance is that risking the creation of a resistant weed is BAD. And that stance persists whatever the empirical evidence might be presented. These people might change their mind about GM Canola mind, but the moral stance would persist.
> When I taught philosophy I recall a student whose sole reason for
>holding that
>there ought to be capital punishment was his belief that it was a
>deterrent. When
>his reading convinced him that it did not deter, he
>changed his mind. Obviously a dispute about the morality of capital punishment
>with this person could be solved by reference to "science" in a very broad
>sense.
This student, too, was making a scientific argument. The implicit moral position is that one life is worth taking if it saves more than one life. That's the moral proposition here, I reckon. This person has maintained that stance, even though s/he has changed his/her mind vis capital punishment.
>Of course this does not mean that everyone would be convinced by such
>facts. A
>Kantian would not be convinced that capital punishment ought to be
>abolished by
>"science" of this sort. However it seems beyond doubt that some moral disputes
>can be settled by science or at least empirical facts.
Again, I think you're mixing up the moral and the technical here. In neither of your examples is the issue really a moral one - it is the shared morals that make the particular empirical facts you mention relevant. The values get you the facts, if you like.
>I suppose someone such as
>Bentham would claim that in principle all such disputes could be settled by
>science. It would need more than stipulative definitions of spheres to show
>otherwise. I suppose that for Habermas much of ordinary moral disputation just
>involves clearing the underbrush. That does not seem helpful in understanding
>moral disputes. If we clear the underbrush the moral dispute often dissolves.
I think I'd like to hear Bentham and Smith - the founding fathers of our intellectual order - on the moral questions you've presented. Or mebbe not ...
An interview with Jeremy Bentham:
'Please explain to me why risking a new strain of resistant weeds is bad,' you'd ask. 'Because, young man, it would risk the greatest happiness of the greater number.' 'But why is that good, venerable Sir' 'Because it's something we might be able to count, young silly.' 'But why is it good to be able to count, oh stuffed-pompous-old-cadaver sitting-in-your-glass-box?' 'Because if we could not count we could not know the greatest happiness of the greater number, you pesky little brat!' 'So do you derive your morality from the instrumental imperative of countability, do you, oh technocratic pillock' 'And where do you get yours, you prescientific little dolt' 'From customs, which must remain ever under the conscious scrutiny of the speech community, oh unctuous one' 'Well, don't you live in a speech community where nothing counts that can not be counted?' 'Er, s'pose so ... ' 'Well, we agree then. Now let me rest!'
An interview with Adam Smith:
'Please explain to me why risking a new strain of resistant weeds is bad,' you'd ask. 'I make no such arrogant claim, young man.' 'Then how shall I know whether it is bad or not, venerable Sir.' 'You can't know yet. No-one can, you see, young silly.' 'When can I know' 'When it has been decided' 'Who will decide' 'no-one will decide' 'But you said it'd be decided.' 'Yes, by the invisible hand' 'And how shall I know when the invisible hand has decided' 'You shall either have that weed or you shall not.' 'But what if we get the weed and it wipes out all vegetable stocks' 'Then the invisible hand will get you new stocks' 'Does the invisible hand know how to do that?' 'Not until it's asked' 'Can we ask it now?' 'No, right now it's being asked something else.' 'But we could all starve while the invisible hand thinks about the second question' 'Don't be silly, you little worry-guts! Invisible hands don't starve!'
And thus does the dissenting lefty disappear in a puff of logic ...