A prof. does not show up for class. One students says. "He ought to be here on time, as I am. I didn't want to get out of my warm bed to listen to this dull stuff but I did, and he gets paid well for it while I pay to come here. The other student says. "But maybe something has happened. Maybe he has some other obligation that is stronger. If nothing else, old Schmuck is a great one for doing what he regards as his duty. Whatever he is doing I believe it will be what he oguht to do." Just then a third student enters and informs the class that old Schmuck has just rescued a young child from the wading pool and taken the child to the hospital. This fact causes the first student to agree with the second.
Of course both agree that the duty to save the child (given the appropriate scenario) is more stringent than the duty to get to class on time but, as Singer points out, they need not both be utilitarians, or deontologists, or prima facie duty types or whatever. So you can have moral disputes arbitrated by facts even when there is no ultimate agreement in theory. Indeed Singer's whole approach to ethics tries to avoid argument about theory when it is not necessary.
You will just have to explain to me the relevance of your remark that theories are always undetermined by facts? I am simply giving examples of types of situations where A makes a moral judgment and B makes a contrary moral judgment and this can be solved by science or reference to the facts. Sometimes science can arbitrate because the disputants are utilitarians-although there are umpteen types of utilitarians and the theory is empty without a theory of the good. But even if there is no moral disagreement about values at a certain level or even about moral theory this does not mean there can be no moral disagreement. Why? Because moral disagreements are disagreements about what we ought to do and even though we share values and theories, we can disagree what we ought to do because of disagreements about facts. Disagreements about facts are often capable of being settled by science or at least appeal to facts.
Of course you are right that disagreements about facts often involve evaluations. I agree. You are just hyperventiliating or something when you say that for every conclusive study there are ten more that conclude to the contrary. The problem often is that there are or even cannot be ten conclusive studies in an area. I don't see any relevance to anythng I have said in your last paragraph.
When you examine an area such as GM seeds and foods how do you determine your position? Proponents argue we ought to push forward with development of more GM seeds etc based upon claims that some will involve less pesticide, better returns to farmers, more food for the worlds hungry, that they are safe, etc. etc. How do you engage in this debate without immersing yourself in the muck. Do you quote form Judith Butler? Or Habermas? If it weren't un-pc these days, I would say the muck is the essence of the matter in most cases.
Cheers, Ken Hanly Kelley wrote:
> well i guess it's just that you're not reading. the claim was that moral
> disputes can't be solved by science ALONE. no one said science couldn't
> help clear up the muck -- as in provide better evidence or facts or what
> have you. but the problem boils down to this: theories are always
> underdetermined by the facts. not even to mention that for every
> "conclusive" study there can be 10 more that conclude something to the
> contrary.
>
> finally, i certainly don't want to live in a world where moral decision
> making is handed over to wankers sitting around telling everyone that the
> answer to this or that moral problem is--voila!--solved because some people
> with alphabet soup after their names said so. having actual debates and
> discussions about the issue, as dennis redmond recently argued, requires
> that people actually participate in and substantively participate in
> politics, that they think through them, take positions, argue and defend
> them, change them if persuaded otherwise, and have a better sense of why
> the issues are important. otherwise, simply making decisions solely on the
> basis of scientific findings leads to what the frankfurt buoyz feared:
> authoritarianism
>
> what you end up with is the democratic equivalent of internet hoaxes:
> people forwarding to everyone they know some peition to be signed or virus
> alert because it "looks" authoritative and was probably passed on by
> someone with alphabet soup after their name! all because people don't
> understand how the internet/email works technologically.
>
> At 11:45 AM 2/3/2000 -0600, you wrote:
> >Fair enough, but this is not at all inconsistent with the point I am
> making. With
> >respect to a large number of moral disputes there is agreement on ultimate
> values or
> >moral principles. However this does not mean that there are not moral
> disputes among
> >people who share these values and principles, disputes that may be solved
> by science or
> >reference to empirical facts. Indeed if the basis for morality is certain
> moral
> >sentiments and sympathy as philosophers such as Hume suggest it would seem
> that only
> >facts plus ultimate appeal to these sentiments could solve moral disputes.
> > Moral disputes are disputes about what we ought to do. They are
> practical in that
> >they are about how we ought to act, not about theory per se or what is.
> They are often
> >solved
> >not by some ultimate discusion of the good or the right but about what is
> the case.
> >Claiming that disputes are not moral disputes if there is underlying moral
> agreement
> >results in it being stipulatively true that probably the vast majority of
> what we now
> >call moral disputes will not be such. I find this departure from ordinary
> discourse
> >unhelpful and it certainly will not stop ordinary folk ( and everyone
> else I expect)
> >from discussion these issues in terms of what
> >ought to be done.
> > Cheers, Ken Hanly
> >
> >gcf at panix.com wrote:
> >
> >> Ken Hanly:
> >> > On what grounds does Habermas claim that science cannot be an arbiter
> of moral
> >> > disputes? Is this just a logical consequence of its being in a
> separate "sphere"?
> >> > I doubt that science can settle all moral disputes but it certainly
> could settle
> >> > some....
> >>
> >> At some point you reach intuitive, non-instrumental
> >> evaluations. There, science can't tell you what to value
> >> unless you arbitrarily decide to evaluate it into a
> >> moral arbiter.
> >>
> >> Gordon
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >