As it happens, some people have been trying to derive morals from evolutionary facts, for example De Waal and Axelrod.
De Waal:
http://cogweb.english.ucsb.edu/Abstracts/McGrew_on_de_Waal_96.html
http://www.emory.edu/LIVING_LINKS/
http://www1.cc.emory.edu/PSYCH/Faculty/dewaal.html
Axelrod:
http://pscs.physics.lsa.umich.edu/Software/ComplexCoop.html
According to these guys, we ought to have evolved some goodness and niceness; but then one wonders where most of it is. Maybe it's the Dark Matter cosmologists are fond of.
Gordon gcf at panix.com
Ken Hanly:
> You originally wrote that Habermas repeatedly tells us that science cannot be
> an arbiter of moral disputes. You will not find in that sentence the term
> ALONE. I grew up in an analytic tradition. I ezpect people to write what they
> mean and mean what they write. I grant that there are remarks about clearing
> the underbrush later in the passage. To follow out the metaphor
> often clearing the underbrush clears away the dispute. Science or appeal to
> fact can do this.
> Your revised thesis is also false. In some cases, science alone can solve moral
> disputes. Where science or facts can solve moral disagreement I expect this is
> because people agree on values at a certain level of abstraction. Consider
> this modification of an example of Peter Singer.
> A prof. does not show up for class. One students says. "He ought to be here
> on time, as I am. I didn't want to get out of my warm bed to listen to this
> dull stuff but I did, and he gets paid well for it while I pay to come here.
> The other student says. "But maybe something has happened. Maybe he has some
> other obligation that is stronger. If nothing else, old Schmuck is a great one
> for doing what he regards as his duty. Whatever he is doing I believe it will
> be what he oguht to do." Just then a third student enters and informs the class
> that old Schmuck has just rescued a young child from the wading pool and taken
> the child to the hospital. This fact
> causes the first student to agree with the second.
> Of course both agree that the duty to save the child (given the appropriate
> scenario) is more stringent than the duty to get to class on time but, as
> Singer points out, they need not both be utilitarians, or deontologists, or
> prima facie duty types or whatever. So you can have moral disputes arbitrated
> by facts even when there is no ultimate agreement in theory. Indeed Singer's
> whole approach to ethics tries to avoid argument about theory when it is not
> necessary.
> You will just have to explain to me the relevance of your remark that
> theories are always undetermined by facts? I am simply giving examples of types
> of situations where A makes a moral judgment and B makes a contrary moral
> judgment and this can be solved by science or reference to the facts. Sometimes
> science can arbitrate because the disputants are utilitarians-although there
> are umpteen types of utilitarians and the theory is empty without a theory of
> the good. But even if there is no moral disagreement about values at a certain
> level or even about moral theory this does not mean there can be no moral
> disagreement.
> Why? Because moral disagreements are disagreements about what we ought to do
> and even though we share values and theories, we can disagree what we ought to
> do because of disagreements about facts. Disagreements about facts are often
> capable of being settled by science or at least appeal to facts.
> Of course you are right that disagreements about facts often involve
> evaluations. I agree. You are just hyperventiliating or something when you say
> that for every conclusive study there
> are ten more that conclude to the contrary. The problem often is that there are
> or even cannot be
> ten conclusive studies in an area. I don't see any relevance to anythng I have
> said in your last paragraph.
> When you examine an area such as GM seeds and foods how do you determine
> your position? Proponents argue we ought to push forward with development of
> more GM seeds etc based upon claims that some will involve less pesticide,
> better returns to farmers, more food for the worlds hungry, that they are safe,
> etc. etc. How do you engage in this debate without immersing yourself in the
> muck. Do you quote form Judith Butler? Or Habermas? If it weren't un-pc these
> days, I would say the muck is the essence of the matter in most cases.
> Cheers, Ken Hanly
> Kelley wrote:
>
> > well i guess it's just that you're not reading. the claim was that moral
> > disputes can't be solved by science ALONE. no one said science couldn't
> > help clear up the muck -- as in provide better evidence or facts or what
> > have you. but the problem boils down to this: theories are always
> > underdetermined by the facts. not even to mention that for every
> > "conclusive" study there can be 10 more that conclude something to the
> > contrary.
> >
> > finally, i certainly don't want to live in a world where moral decision
> > making is handed over to wankers sitting around telling everyone that the
> > answer to this or that moral problem is--voila!--solved because some people
> > with alphabet soup after their names said so. having actual debates and
> > discussions about the issue, as dennis redmond recently argued, requires
> > that people actually participate in and substantively participate in
> > politics, that they think through them, take positions, argue and defend
> > them, change them if persuaded otherwise, and have a better sense of why
> > the issues are important. otherwise, simply making decisions solely on the
> > basis of scientific findings leads to what the frankfurt buoyz feared:
> > authoritarianism
> >
> > what you end up with is the democratic equivalent of internet hoaxes:
> > people forwarding to everyone they know some peition to be signed or virus
> > alert because it "looks" authoritative and was probably passed on by
> > someone with alphabet soup after their name! all because people don't
> > understand how the internet/email works technologically.
> >
> > At 11:45 AM 2/3/2000 -0600, you wrote:
> > >Fair enough, but this is not at all inconsistent with the point I am
> > making. With
> > >respect to a large number of moral disputes there is agreement on ultimate
> > values or
> > >moral principles. However this does not mean that there are not moral
> > disputes among
> > >people who share these values and principles, disputes that may be solved
> > by science or
> > >reference to empirical facts. Indeed if the basis for morality is certain
> > moral
> > >sentiments and sympathy as philosophers such as Hume suggest it would seem
> > that only
> > >facts plus ultimate appeal to these sentiments could solve moral disputes.
> > > Moral disputes are disputes about what we ought to do. They are
> > practical in that
> > >they are about how we ought to act, not about theory per se or what is.
> > They are often
> > >solved
> > >not by some ultimate discusion of the good or the right but about what is
> > the case.
> > >Claiming that disputes are not moral disputes if there is underlying moral
> > agreement
> > >results in it being stipulatively true that probably the vast majority of
> > what we now
> > >call moral disputes will not be such. I find this departure from ordinary
> > discourse
> > >unhelpful and it certainly will not stop ordinary folk ( and everyone
> > else I expect)
> > >from discussion these issues in terms of what
> > >ought to be done.
> > > Cheers, Ken Hanly
> > >
> > >gcf at panix.com wrote:
> > >
> > >> Ken Hanly:
> > >> > On what grounds does Habermas claim that science cannot be an arbiter
> > of moral
> > >> > disputes? Is this just a logical consequence of its being in a
> > separate "sphere"?
> > >> > I doubt that science can settle all moral disputes but it certainly
> > could settle
> > >> > some....
> > >>
> > >> At some point you reach intuitive, non-instrumental
> > >> evaluations. There, science can't tell you what to value
> > >> unless you arbitrarily decide to evaluate it into a
> > >> moral arbiter.
> > >>
> > >> Gordon
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
>
>
>
>