>> I think Chomsky's account, both here and in his writing during the
events, > have been a bit stuck in the past. ... I think if Chomsky's
commentary on the recent > events East Timor had a fault, it was a tendency
to dismiss the all > complications and uncertainties of the post-cold war
world as > epiphenomena.<<
I'm inclined to agree. Chomsky supposes that the same conditions apply now as they did over 20 years ago. They don't.
The US could have made all the phone calls it liked, and I think that indeed it made a few. No one seems to have paid much attention, and the US was, it seems, increasingly cut out of the loop.
1. Habibe sprung the idea of a referendum on the Indonesian Cabinet after insistences from the Australian Government to 'resolve' the continuing problem of East Timor. Up to that point, the proposal from the Indon Foreign Minister (agreed to by the Indon Cabinet) was for a managed phase leading toward autonomy (ie., not independance).
2. The US (and Portugal) argued for an armed UN presence during the ballot, but the Australian Government assured the UN that the Indon military had "everything under control" and so would not be needed.
This you already know of, but perhaps not these bits below:
3. The Australian Govt, in the lead up to the ballot, as reports of the organisation of militia began to be known, instructed its Australian spook-liason in the US to cease passing on Australian-eyes-only info to his counterparts. Usual practice is for a sharing of info without restriction. Indications are that he refused to do this and was first warned, and then sacked. Two days later, he was found hanged in his garage -- suicide. Make of that what you will, but at minimum it sounds to me like there was info that the Australian Govt had decided to not pass on reports (I'll return to this) to the US, which it deemed to be liable to leak to the media, UN or WB.
4. The longest-serving aid worker in East Timor, who had been instructed by the Aust Govt to send back intelligence reports -- Australia seems to have a well-established indistinction between aid and spying --, is insisting that he gave the Aust Govt detailed reports of the Indon military's organisation of the militia as far back as April. As the situation got worse, he was told to downplay info about military-sponsored killings and harassment in his written reports and instead "look at the big picture", ie., Aust-Indon relations. I'm assuming that this is part of the info the Aust Govt did not want shared with the US. He's one of the more reliable sources, having gone into ET four years ago with a strong pro-Indon position -- in fact, he wouldn't have been allowed there unless he was.
Something else that might be of interest:
from ABC News Thursday February 17, 2000
"World Bank rejects Indon funds misuse claim
The World Bank says there is no evidence its funds were misused by Indonesia as it fought to retain control of East Timor. SBS television has aired a report alleging $12 million, earmarked for welfare and development, was channelled by Jakarta from the World Bank to militia groups in East Timor. However, the World Bank has rejected the allegations."
The SBS programme by Mark Davis -- love that guy -- was pretty formidable in marshalling both documentary and oral evidence from a range of sources all saying the same thing. It even got the WB's second in command in Indonesia to admit that he had seen one of the documents, but still forwarded subsequent loans to Indonesia.
I do, however, disagree a little with Michael's characterisation of the Indon authorities as "loose" compared to 1976. Sure, the connections between the US and Indonesia are much looser; and there are factions within the military/state, but it's quite certain from all the info about that the lines of authority were both known and, well, authoritative. Also, having spoken to people returned from ET, their info tells me that the problem with investigation into the massacres is the availability of resources. Whether this is a conspiracy or a disinterest who know, but I'm prepared to go with the latter.
But, yes, the continuing massacres in the Moloccas and the fact that no one pays much attention suggests a propagandisation of war and policy that seems to vindicate even Baudrillard. I would add that it has much to do with the absence of the Vatican as a significant propagandist, compared to ET.
Ps. as I suggested ever since the CNRT refused to engage the militia, there is a massive split opening up between the CNRT and Dili youth. That might be one to watch in the coming months. Already there have been riots, but not as yet against the CNRT itself.
Angela