MALUKU: WHILE ELEPHANTS FIGHT, THE PEOPLE OF MALUKU DIE
The chain of sectarian conflict in Maluku now spreading throughout Sulawesi, Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara and Java has been triggered and fed by a number of provocateurs paid by the Suharto family and several cronies, according to monitoring by a sociologist and two human rights organizations, KONTRAS and Komnas HAM.
By GEORGE ADITJONDRO ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE INDONESIAN military's tradition of manipulating social unrest, and unilaterally attempting to deflate the emergent dynamics of civil society by creating or supporting new organizations oriented towards the military, is becoming increasingly relevant today.
Lately, in the wake of the forced evacuation of the Indonesian Armed Forces from Timor Lorosae (East Timor), a nation they had ravaged for nearly a quarter of a century, and after the Indonesian Armed Forces' dual function has been successfully dismantled, influencing the social legitimacy of the Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri regime, old methods to spark "horizontal conflict" have been revived.
For more than a year now, the people of the Maluku Islands, recently divided into two to become the province of Maluku with the city of Ambon as its capital, and the province of North Maluku with Ternate as its capital, have been embroiled in a "civil war" between Muslims and Christians. Fatalities have so far reached 2000, a high percentage of the population of 2 million.
News about the incidents have spread orally for a year, and now, information that has long been disseminated through the Internet has finally made it to the pages of the mass media: The chain of sectarian conflict in Maluku now spreading throughout Sulawesi, Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara and Java has been triggered and fed by a number of provocateurs paid by the Suharto family and several cronies. That is the result of monitoring by the Halmahera sociologist, Thamrin Amal Tomagola, a professor at the University of Indonesia's Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, and two human rights organizations, KONTRAS and Komnas HAM. The indications became clearer after Komnas HAM discovered fake documents in the streets of Ambon inciting the population to religious war, following a string of bloody events in the area (Sydney Morning Herald, 15 January 2000).
Three provocateurs from Maluku whose names have come up frequently are: Butje Sarpara, Dicky Wattimena and Yorris Raweyai. Sarpara is a former teacher from North Maluku, who has also been head of the Agricultural Office in Jayapura (now Port Numbay) in West Papua. Colonel Wattimena is a former member of the Presidential Security Corps (PASWALPRES) and former Mayor of Ambon. Yorris Raweyai is the deputy chair of the Pancasila Youth, close to Bambang Trihatmodjo, the second son of former President Suharto (Jakarta Post, 18 January 2000; Sydney Morning Herlad, 19 January 2000).
These provocateurs do not work alone. In particular, Yorris Raweyai, whose formal residence is in Jakarta but, in collaboration with Yapto Suryosumarno, chair of the Pancasila Youth, is reported to be involved in provocationary activities to incite ethnic conflict in other provinces, for example West Kalimantan, where the Malay and Dayak ethnic groups who, last year were comrades in arms against Madurese migrants are beginning to wage a bloody conflict against each other (SiaR, 16 April l999).
In Ambon itself, the provocateurs need only to incite Christian and Muslim gangs of young delinquents to spark conflict. These gangs in turn have their respective "bosses" in Jakarta, who are attempting to gain the support of Suharto's children.
The gang of Christian delinquents is named Cowok Keristen (Christian Boys), shortened to Coker, and uses the Maranatha Protestant church as headquarters. In Jakarta, they are connected to two Moluccan Christian youths, Milton Matuanakota and Ongky Pieters. This gang of Moluccan Christian youths dominate the shopping centre, parking area and gambling dens in West Jakarta. After the Ketapang incidents in Jakarta, November l998, hundreds of Milton and Ongky's followers moved to Ambon.
In Jakarta, antagonists of the Milton and Ongky group are represented by Ongen Sangaji, a Pancasila Youth activist and coordinator of a Moluccan Muslim university student organization. Many members of this group were recruited into the PAM Swakarsa (civilian security troops) used by then Chief of Armed Forces, General Wiranto, and Acting President Habibie to cordon off the parliament building from university students protesting the Extraordinary Session of the MPR in November l998. Meanwhile, Ongen is reported to have close ties to Bambang Trihatmodjo, while Milton is said to be closer to Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (van Klinken, n.d.; HRW l999:8).
The bloody conflict in Maluku does not involve only civilian leaders and the former Ambon mayor. Active military and police are also suspected by Tamagola to be involved in practices to incite conflict. He is of the opinion that the network of provocators can be traced back to connections with former Minister of Defense and Security, Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto (Sydney Morning Herald, 19 January 2000).
Three members of the TNI/ Police were apprehended in a raid to impose the curfew in Ambon, last Saturday evening, 15 January. The three individuals were: one member of Kopassus (army special forces) and two members of the police. "The three members of the security forces were apprehended because they were on the streets after the curfew lasting from 22:00 East Indonesia Time to 06:00 East Indonesia Time," said the Commander of Military region XVI/ Pattimura, Brig. Gen. (TNI) Max Tamaela to Ambonese journalists (Jawa Pos, 17 January 2000).
Unfortunately, it is not merely one or two "Armed Forces elements" who are involved. According to one of my sources in Ambon, in early December l999, after the President and Vice Presidentís visit to Ambon, the TNI Commander sent 500 troops to the area. Upon arrival at their destination, they rested in a number of barracks. However, only some 200 troops reached the barracks, while 300 of those who were sent on the same ship disappeared with their weapons.
Where did they go? It turns out that they have disappeared into the civilian population. Not long after, the "massacres" erupted in late December l999. Indications that the massacres were triggered by the troops who disappeared from the harbour include the discovery of precisely the same type of weapons as those owned by the 200 troops still on duty in the hands of civilians. This incident has been reported to the Commander of the Armed Forces but is still kept a secret.
>From where do the provocators receive their "operational funds?" Apart from
the Suharto family, they are also funded by two Suharto cronies with
business interests in North Maluku, i.e. Eka Cipta Widjaja and Prajogo
Pangestu (Jakarta Post, 18 January 2000).
Indeed, the Eka Tjipta Widjaja family is the owner of the Sinar Mas group, of which PT Sinar Mas Agro Resources and Technology (SMART) is a member company, and chaired by General Yoga Sugama, a relative and business partner of the Suharto family. A SMART subsidiary, PT Global Agronusa Indonesia has run a banana plantation of some 2,000 hectares since December 1991 in Halmahera, in a joint venture with the US fruit giant, Del Monte (IEFR, l997: 82-83; Swa, 2-27 November l996: 86-87).
Prajogo Pangestu, meanwhile, is owner of the Barito Pacific group, in which two Suharto children (Tutut and Bambang), a Suharto son-in-law (Indra Rukmana) and two younger brothers of the late Mrs. Tien Suharto (Ibnu Hartomo and Bernard Ibnu Hardoyo) have either shares or positions. This group owns the largest number of forest license in Indonesia (52 areas) for a total of more than 5 million hectares.
Prajogo Pangestu is also noteworthy as one of the largest contributors to the Suharto clique. An investigation by the Indonesian Attorney General revealed that in l990 Indoverbank NV in the Netherlands received US$ 225 million in the name of three foundations chaired by Suharto -- Supersemar, Dharmais, Dakab -- from Prayogo Pangestu, transferred from Prajogoís account at the Singapore Branch of Citibank and BDN, Jakarta (Waspada, 22 May 1999, quoted >from Antara). This Barito Pacific Group boss also gave a contribution of Rp. 80 billion for the June l999 Golkar campaign, amlost more than a quarter of the total cost (of Rp. 350 billion) of the campaign. In addition, Prajogo also "contributed" to the All Indonesia Wrestling Association (PGSI) through the personal account of the Attorney General at that time, Andi Ghalib (Brown, l999: 16).
Prajogo Pangestuís "treasury" in Maluku is enormous, as the Barito Pacific group controls PT Green Delta (HPH or forest concession covering 124,000 hectares, ending in December 2000); PT HBI Buntu Marannu (concession covering 48,000 hectares, ending July 2007); PT Mangole Timber Producers (concessions covering 191,800 hectares) and a plywood plant on the island of Mangole, partly expiring October 2010, and the rest April 2013); PT Seram Cahaya Timber (concession covering 58,000 hectares on Seram island, until January 2012); PT Taliabu Timber (concessions covering 100,000 hectares and plywood factory in Mangole island, expiring July 2009); PT Trio Maluku Pacific Raya (concessions covering 105,000 hectares until February 2001); PT Tunggal Agathis Indah Wood Industry (concessions covering 125,000 hectares and plywood factory on Jailolo island, until August 2012); PT Tunas Forestra (concessions covering 42,300 hectares, until April 2012); PT Wana Adhi Guna (concessions covering 64,000 hectares, until March 2009); glue factory PT Wiranusa Trisatya on Taliabu island, and PT Yurina Wood Industry plywood factory in Ternate (Brown, l999: 14-16, 40, 62; PDBI: 83-84, 114).
The Cendana cloque and the extreme right group of generals have yet another source of funds with big business in Maluku in Tommy Winata, boss of the Artha Graha group, reportedly very close to Yorris Raweyai (Tempo, 31 May-6 June 1999: 39-50). He is a shareholder in the PT Ting Sheen Bandasejahtera fishing company investing US$200 million, projected to have a capacity of catching 2.5 million tonnes of fish per year. This fishing armada is harboured at Desa Ngadi, Tual, and is a joint venture with Bambang Trihatmodjo and a Taiwanese company (Swa, 22 August-11 September 1996: 128-129).
There is a possibility that he too has contributed to the activities of provocators in Southeastern Maluku, in view of the fact that religious conflict in Maluku began 15-17 January 1999 in Dobo (the Aru Islands regency), by 31 March 1999 had revisited Southeastern Maluku, in the city of Tual (Lesser Kei islands) and by 6 April 1999 had spread to the Greater Kei islands.
It is clear that the conflict in Maluku is in fact an effect of political struggles in Jakarta. A number of generals who feel that their powers have been curtailed with the appointment of the new Armed Forces Chief from the Navy, are trying to show that the new Chief is incabale of controlling the situation in Maluku. This group, who have the most at stake in maintaining the Armed Forces dual function, are trying to demonstrate that the Armed Forces -- specifically the Army -- are still needed as the peace-makers in the midst of a civil society prone to conflict. This has been demonstrated in Maluku, where thousands of troops are now deployed to "soothe" both parties burning with revenge and the spirit of jihad.
In addition, Islamic groups, who feel they have not been given an appropriate share in the Wahid and Megawati government are also attempting to maintain a warlike atmosphere in Maluku, in order to be able to mobilize their masses to "pressure" -- or, if possible, to bring down -- a president who is half blind and a vice president who is unable to speak.
Finally, behind all this, the one who stands to gain the most from the upheaval in Maluku is Suharto and his family and cronies, who thereby increase the distance between them and efforts to bring them to court to account for their political and economic crimes. They clearly benefit from the disturbances of the peace that serve to perpetuate the Armed Forces' dual function, especially as the Armed Forces, through scores of foundations and pensioned officers is deeply enmeshed in the tentacles of the Suharto family business (see Samego, 1998; Aditjondro, 1998: 32-36).
Bibliography:
Aditjondro, G.J. (1998). Dari Soeharto ke Habibie: Guru kencing berdiri, murid kencing berlari: kedua puncak korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme rezim Orde Baru. Jakarta: Pijar Indonesia & Masyarakat Indonesia untuk Kemanusiaan.
Brown, David. W. (1999). Addicted to Rent: Corporate and Spatial Distribution of Forest Resources in Indonesia -- Implications for Forest Sustainability and Government Policy. Jakarta: Indonesia-UK Tropical Forest Management Programme, Provincial Forest Management Programme.
HRW [Human Rights Watch] (1999). Indonesia: The violence in Ambon. New York: Human Rights Watch.
Van Klinken, Gerry (n.d.). What caused the Ambon violence? Perhaps not religious hatred, but a corrupt civil service sparked the bloodletting. Article on the Internet.
PDBI [Pusat Data Business Indonesia] (1994). Forestry Indonesia.Jakarta: Pusat Data Business Indonesia.
Samego, Indria et al (1998). Bila ABRI berbisnis. Bandung; Mirzan.
Dr George Aditjondro, an Indonesian academic, is now on the staff of Newcastle University. He monitors human rights in Indonesia.