second try, I've apparently had another post on this topic disappear, ummm... Michael Hoover
2nd question 1st: can't say, haven't read book, but you apparently have so maybe you can say (which you might have done in previous post, of course, it might have taken more time than multiple 1-2 sentence blather that you incessantly send to list).
1st question 2nd: Nov. 1940, Japan wished to negotiate agreement that would've nullified Axis Pact participation, withdrawn all military forces from China, restored Chinese geographical boundaries and Chiang Kai-shek gov't --- Jan. 1941, Roosevelt/Hull kill any/all discussion of matter with comment that proposal will be taken under advisement (Exhibit #3441, _Record of Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East_).
Focus on what Roosevelt knew/didn't know prior to Pearl Harbor, deceived/ didn't deceive US population, took/didn't take 'back road' obscures administration's contribution to war. Of course, much US popular history downplays/ignores foreign policy until very late 1930s (even very early 1940s) in favor of New Deal. How many folks know use of NRA funds to build naval ships? Or Roosevelt budgets consistently raising marker for largest peacetime military expenditures? How about US refusing to consider naval capacity limits that would have hampered its ability to act offensively outside of home waters? These, and other, things occurred prior to Roosevelt's 1937 'quarantine' speech intended to warn Japan (followed by both economic pressure & use of navy in far east policy) as well as frighten US people (in attempt to divert attention from renewed economic downturn).
Roosevelt policy was driven by 'open door' (euphemism for US intervention) doctrine for China that Japanese expansion threatened. While US policy- makers tended to discuss US interests in China in future terms given much larger economic relations with Japan at the time, they assumed that US stake in China constituted long-range vital national interest (one needn't be marxist to understand capturing new/expanding markets). Significantly, Japan took page from US diplomatic theory/practice of hemispheric superiority/regional intervention when it proclaimed Monroe Doctrine for East Asia in 1934. Point isn't to lay blame or exonerate but to go beyond framing things in 'good guy-bad guy' moralist terms that place blinders over inter-imperialist conflict. Unable to do so in their role as ideological mouthpieces, FDR/New Deal defenders have had little choice but to support administration's foreign policy, covering over actual aim of empire building with idea that US pursued nobler objectives.