Gordon:
> >In that case one should be able to decide that any object,
> >collection of stuff, or indeed imaginary entity is a computer.
Dace:
> I forget who said that a thermostat is a computer with two thoughts: It's
> too cold (switch on the furnace), and it's no longer too cold (switch off
> the furnace.) But if you operate it manually, flicking it on when you feel
> cold and off when you feel warm again, then it's not a computer, because it
> doesn't do anything; it doesn't make any computations-- that is, it doesn't
> do what we do when we make computations. Whatever "thoughts" a "computer"
> seems to have are projections of our imagination.
This doesn't answer my objection. How can we differentiate a computer from anything else if it's just a box full of stuff?
> >In fact it would be rather odd if mental acts and states did
> >not enter into _all_ objects which are worked on by conscious,
> >purposive beings, especially tools. What would keep them out?
> That our tools reflect our consciousness does not mean they contain it.
> Even the brain does not contain consciousness (any more than space contains
> time.)
Well, then, where is it?