On Wed, 14 Jun 2000, Gordon Fitch wrote:
> Gordon:
> > >In that case one should be able to decide that any object,
> > >collection of stuff, or indeed imaginary entity is a computer.
>
> Dace:
> > I forget who said that a thermostat is a computer with two thoughts
It was David Chalmers, and I think it was three: it's too cold in here, it's too warm in here, and it's just right in here.
> This doesn't answer my objection. How can we differentiate a computer
> from anything else if it's just a box full of stuff?
The modern-classical argument is John Searle's "Chinese Box" argument: that computers don't think because they lack consciousness and intentionality. You can find various forms of it, and answers to it, all over the internet (where interest in AI runs high). Chalmers in particular has posted Searle's review of his book (where he devotes a chapter to the thoughts of thermostats and in defense of panpsychism) as well as a reply from each.
As to how we can differentiate computers from thermostats, both sides seem to agree we can't. It's the one thing both sides do agree on, that a thermostat is just a very simple computer. Hence the argument.
Michael
__________________________________________________________________________ Michael Pollak................New York City..............mpollak at panix.com