> Eisenhower always said that it was because the task was to defeat
> Hitler as rapidly as possible, and that any actions with other
> aims--no matter how meritorious--were subordinated to that end.
> Darlan had power and authority, and Eisenhower thought that
> installing him as proconsul in North Africa would shave two to four
> weeks off the time needed to consolidate the American occupation of
> Morocco and Algeria.
>
So FDR's opposition to Giraud was unrelated to his opposition to De Gaulle
-- a figure with enormous power and authority, but who frequently differed
with the State Department's plans for post-war development?
This is your field, not mine, so I defer conditionally to your erudition. But it seems like you're not addressing the possibility that Roosevelt and the State Department planners had specific plans for post-war Europe, mostly based on perceived U.S. self-interest, which they were willing to pursue in both savory and unsavory ways if need be.
And that sometimes supporting fascists rather than local nationalists with considerably greater moral and popular legitimacy was the most expedient way to realize those plans. Obviously (I hope obviously ) this took place in Latin America but also sometimes in Europe too.
Seth
Seth