>And I don't think Singer is being paternalistic.
Well, I don't know if Singer is more paternalistic than other utilitarians, but utilitarians are often committed to the kind of paternalism that Kantians would reject. To sit in judgment of someone else's "quality of life" (or happiness), as Singer does, is a paternalistic act. I'm afraid Singer's attitude toward people of color & the absolutely poor is also paternalistic. For instance, in "Rich and Poor," _Practical Ethics_, Singer says:
***** Population growth is therefore not a reason against giving overseas aid, although it should make us think about the kind of aid to give. Instead of food handouts, it may be better to give aid that leads to a slowing of population growth. This may mean agricultural assistance for the rural poor, or assistance with education, or the provision of contraceptive services....
One awkward question remains. What should we do about a poor and already overpopulated country that, for religious or nationalistic reasons, restricts the use of contraceptives and refuses to slow its population growth? Should we nevertheless offer development assistance? Or should we make our offer conditional on effective steps being taken to reduce the birth rate? To the latter course, some would object that putting conditions on aid is an attempt to impose our own ideas on independent sovereign nations. So it is -- but is this imposition unjustifiable? If the argument for an obligation to assist is sound, we have an obligation to reduce absolute poverty; but we have no obligation to make sacrifices that, to the best of our knowledge, have no prospect of reducing poverty in the long run. Hence we have no obligation to assist countries whose governments have policies that will make our aid ineffective. (240-1) *****
While I, too, think that contraceptives should be widely available (for feminist reasons, not because of fear of "overpopulation"), the idea that it is justifiable to make aid conditional upon the acceptance of the rich nation's population control plan is objectionable.
>He's just saying that the
>category of 'intelligence' is not a morally interesting one.
In the case of race, no, but in the cases of mental disability & "animal rights," "intelligence," for obvious reasons, becomes a morally interesting concept. The severely mentally retarded humans are "non-persons" whereas "self-conscious" animals are "persons," according to Singer.
Yoshie