<< > Yoshie: And goodbye to natural rights.
>>
>
>Justin: So, you don't think there are things that we ought not do to each other
>whatever the consequences (moral catastrophe, perhaps, excepted) and
>independently of social convention?>>>
Y: Well, concerning the everyday politics of here and now, in some areas of
political concerns I have a far longer not-to-do list than you do (recall
our PEN-L discussion on anti-racism, for instance); in others, I may have a
shorter list than you probably do (e.g., abortion).
J. Huh? I don't oppose abortion or think it morally wrong, all I said was that the issue is hard.
Y: But I think natural rights don't help us discuss these questions. For
instance, if you (or anyone) don't do X, is it because of your adherence to
the doctrine of natural rights that you don't engage in X? It's not as
though you would ever turn into a rapist if natural rights (or any
philosophy of your preference) allowed you to, I trust.
J. Natural rights is a moral theory. It is supposed to explain and justify our concrete judgments, It is not, except in the most attenuated and indirect way, supposed to exaplin our behavior or change it. We have had this diuscussion about moral theory and we don't need need to repeat it. I don't rape or kill or steal for the same reason any honest and decent person doesn't: I was inculcated in good habits by good models very young. Aristotle got that right.
However, what habits are good ones? Moral theory is supposed to systematize and maybe force revisions in our judgments about these things. So, utilitarians say, good habits and right actions are those that promote the geberal happiness. Kantians saym they are those that pass the categorical imperative. Etc.
Now, natural rights theory is an ambiguous and ill-defined notion. Some theologically inclined people havea rich divine command notion of what NR are. Nozick, however, says--I think this is a usefully pragmatic way of putting it--that natural righta talk just captured the idea that there are things you can't do to people _no matter what_ (maybe excepting moral catastrophe),a nd this is not because of social convention but because it would be wrong to do those things. Put that way, natural rights theory combines moral realism (independence of socisl convention) with the idea that rights trump welfare. I agree with both of those positions, so I am a ntural rights theorist.
Y: Moral standards have evolved historically, often through conflicts and
struggles.
J: And for an moral realist like me, that just shows that some people have been wrong in their moral beliefs. People used to think that slavery was OK, but they were wrong then, Slavery is never OK.
Y: I think that moral questions are best approached in a historical
materialist fashion.
J. Me too, and I have written a lot about a historical materialist approach to ethics, showing that materialism does not require relativism.
Y. That our morals & mores have historically changed,
however, doesn't mean they are necessarily insignificant or do not govern
our conduct, does it?
J. Change also does not show that morals are relative.
--jks