>J. Huh? I don't oppose abortion or think it morally wrong, all I said was
>that the issue is hard.
What makes the question X "hard" and the question Y "easy"? The nature of X & Y independent of social relations? Or the ensembles of social relations that we live? To be more specific, what makes abortion a "hard" moral question, while leaving the majority of the world impoverished & dying due to lack of clean water, sanitation, etc. is seldom perceived to be a "moral" question even, much less a "hard" moral question? What made abortion a "hard" moral question in the middle of the nineteenth century in America, whereas before it had not been, even for the Catholic church?
Ideology works in part by making some questions matters of morality while leaving others outside of ethical considerations. In understanding sexism, this is an important consideration. Men having lots of sexual encounters is "natural," while women doing the same are "sluts." A rich married woman giving birth to an able-bodied boby is an occasion for celebration, while a poor woman giving birth to her baby (especially if it is not her first baby) is an occasion for moral condemnation. A rich woman working outside home without taking care of her own baby raises an eyebrow ("why, she can afford to stay home"!), while a poor woman taking care of her own baby on welfare is immoral, making herself a burden on society.
>J. Natural rights is a moral theory. It is supposed to explain and justify
>our concrete judgments, It is not, except in the most attenuated and indirect
>way, supposed to exaplin our behavior or change it. We have had this
>diuscussion about moral theory and we don't need need to repeat it. I don't
>rape or kill or steal for the same reason any honest and decent person
>doesn't: I was inculcated in good habits by good models very young. Aristotle
>got that right.
>
>However, what habits are good ones? Moral theory is supposed to systematize
>and maybe force revisions in our judgments about these things. So,
>utilitarians say, good habits and right actions are those that promote the
>geberal happiness. Kantians saym they are those that pass the categorical
>imperative. Etc.
Isn't there, though, a problem in systematizing? Why should our moral judgments be justified by appealing to one principle (in Kant, autonomy of practical reason + universality of maxims; in Bentham, the sum of total happiness)? As an advocate of free thought, do you not see systems of morality as an affront to supple dialectical reason? For instance, in the dichotomy between Kant and Bentham, shouldn't Marxists, as dialectical thinkers, see the contradiction of capitalism, a mode of production which forces the separation of intentions from consequences, freedoms of individuals from pleasures of all, etc.?
>J: And for an moral realist like me, that just shows that some people have
>been wrong in their moral beliefs. People used to think that slavery was OK,
>but they were wrong then, Slavery is never OK.
Well, "people" didn't think that slavery was OK; pro-slavery whites did. I don't think slaves, free blacks, & white abolitionists ever thought slavery was OK. Even when slaves never had a political voice, they demonstrated their unhappiness by running away, sabotaging their tools, slowing down, etc.; and when given a chance, they revolted. Is this what you mean by "moral realism," though? A kind of standpoint epistemology which argues that the truth of an oppressive society is better seen through the viewpoint of the oppressed? Or a historical materialist approach that argues that oppressive social relations give birth to their own gravediggers, since the oppressed class's happiness and their standards of justice cannot be brought into practice without abolishing the social relations that brought them into being? I'm afraid that you mean something other than the above when you argue for standards of justice independent of "social conventions."
Now, Engels says with regard to slavery:
***** It is very easy to inveigh against slavery and similar things in general terms, and to give vent to high moral indignation at such infamies. Unfortunately all that this conveys is only what everyone knows, namely, that these institutions of antiquity are no longer in accord with our present conditions and our sentiments, which these conditions determine. But it does not tell us one word as to how these institutions arose, why they existed, and what role they played in history. (Engels, _Anti-Duhring_) *****
We might add that it doesn't tell us how to abolish capitalism, sexism, racism, etc. either. Moral indignation does have its place in politics -- for instance, agitation -- but Engels is saying that the notion of transhistorical standards of justice doesn't help us in, in fact prevents us from, understanding how capitalism arose, how it works, and how it may be abolished.
Yoshie