http://www.apsanet.org/PS/sept99/almond.cfm
The Size and Composition of the Anti-Nazi Opposition in Germany Gabriel A. Almond, Stanford University, with Wolfgang Krauss
This document, titled "The Size and Composition of the Anti-Nazi Opposition in Germany," was found among the reports of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSB) of the U.S. Air Force in the National Archives. The finder was Professor Karl-Heinz Reuband of the Institute of the Social Sciences of the Heinrich Heine University of Dusseldorf, who was engaged in research on German attitudes during the Nazi period. The report was identified in handwriting, "Technical Report, G. Almond." There is an illegible set of letters and numbers, designating its location in the National Archives. Professor Reuband notified me of his find, and sent me a copy.
This report, written in a collaboration with my colleague Wolfgang Kraus, the details of which I have forgotten, was one of the supporting reports of the Morale Division of USSBS. The Morale Division was headed by Rensis Likert, later of University of Michigan Survey Research Center fame. The USSBS social science team included several of the social psychologists who would later staff the Institute of Social Sciences and the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan--Rensis Likert, Angus Campbell, Daniel Katz, Dorwin Cartwright, as well as Otto Klineberg and Herbert Hyman of Columbia University. The major job of the Morale Division was to conduct an attitude survey on the effects of bombing on German morale using a questionnaire administered to a probability sample of Germans in the immediate aftermath of the war.
In the Morale Division I was given the assignment of planning and conducting a supplementary study on documentary sources, such as surviving records of German police and intelligence organizations and on interviews with captured and interned Gestapo and Sicherheitsdienst officials and surviving opposition leaders. My section consisted of two six-men teams: one headed by me, and a second headed by Wolfgang Kraus, a political scientist knowledgeable about National Socialist Germany who was on leave from George Washington University. Each team had a jeep and weapons carrier, and consisted of two German-speaking GIs and one or two military personnel. My team went east, first to Leipzig and Halle--to territory that would end up in the Soviet Zone, but at the time recently American-captured and still American-occupied--and then north to the British Zone--to Hannover, Braunschweig, Hamburg, Bremen, and Luebeck. Kraus's team went first to Cologne and then south to the American Zone, working in Wiesbaden, Mainz, Darmstadt, Frankfurt, and Munich. From mid-May until mid-July, the two teams were in the field accumulating documents, interviewing in the internment camps, and interviewing opposition and concentration camp survivors.
In mid-July we gathered in Bad Nauheim, at the headquarters of the Strategic Bombing Survey, and drafted the report. The report drew on our interviews and documentary materials. Some of the prose was written by Wolfgang Kraus, but I drafted and edited the final report. Wolfgang Kraus and I continued our collaboration when we returned to the States, ultimately producing two coauthored chapters on the German resistance in a book published in 1948.1