1. The Soviet strategic position in August 1939. In August 1939 the Soviets were at war with the Japanese Sixth Army in Mongolia ("Khalkin Gol"). Not declared of course, but war nonetheless. Hundreds of planes were shot down. Thousands of tanks and armored vehicles were in combat. The ultimately successful Soviet offensive at Khalkin Gol began *on August 20, 1939*. (See Zhukov's _Reminiscences and Reflections_ Vol 1, Ch.6).
In brief, the Soviet-German treaty of August 23rd, 1939 was a stunning surprise to the Japanese military, who were forced to give up the Mongolian operation. Japan repaid the compliment in the summer of 1941 with their decision to remain neutral vis-a-vis the Soviets and attack to the south, with the decisive result that the Soviets were able to fight a one front war. Why decisive? As Rob has pointed out, by the time the German offensive came to a halt in front of Moscow in November-December 1941 any chance for a "blitzkrieg" victory over the Soviets was over. This result was in no small part achieved by Soviet troops brought in from the FarEastern front.
How could the Soviets have been so certain Japan would not attack as to strip their FarEastern defences? The most successful and world historically important spy in all of modern times was the brilliant and gentle Ozaki Hotsumi, high ranking aide to the then Japanese Prime Minister, who was reporting the Japanese strategic decisions as they were taken (via Richard Sorge, key aide to the German Ambassador in Tokyo) to the Soviets. The Soviet Command of course deserve great credit for recognizing the value of this intelligence and acting on it. A wonderful book is Chalmers Johnson's _ An instance of treason : Ozaki Hotsumi and the Sorge spy ring_(1990).
2. Soviet defensive strategy in 1941. As has been noted here, there has been a massive disagreement as to whether the Soviets were "unprepared" in June 1941. This disagreement broke out into the open among Soviet historians back in 1966, with the "unprepared' thesis advanced by Nekrich and the critique of that position by Deborin and Telpukhovsky. Here I will not again rely on John Erickson (whose great work was based on both Soviet and German archives) - though he comes to much the same conclusion - but rather on Bryan Fugate (_Operation Barbarossa_ (1984)) - who typically for Western cold war military historians is most at home in the German archive. Fugate does however closely analyze the record of the Soviet Command's war game exercise of February 1941 (which was based on - of course - the assumption of a Nazi invasion along the whole front from Rumania to Finland, and in which table exercise the Soviet forces were beaten). Fugate concludes - on impressive evidence - that faced with the clear military superiority of the German army, the Soviet Command decided to sacrifice large frontier formations (in particular in the Bialystock salient) in favor of a defense in depth. If the frontier formations were stripped of artillery and lacked the most modern armor this was neither unintentional nor a mistake.
But the key to the victory for humanity on the "Eastern Front" was the organizational ability of the cadres of the Communist Party of the USSR who took a leading role - by ALL accounts - both in the military resistance, and in the phenomenal organization of a war economy under the most drastic of conditions. As I've said here before, they're collectively the foremost heroes of the 20th Century. And foremost among Stalin's victims.
Rob wrote:
> Anyway, I'm looking forward to some putting right by the
> list's impressive array of military historians.
Despite this assured and self-certain post, that's not me. I imagine myself more (pace Tom) as an amateur urologist.
john mage