>From Milosevic to the Future
>From the standpoint of cameras and Western journalists, the fall of
Milosevic appears indistinguishable from other velvet and near-velvet
revolutions that have toppled dictators from Prague to Manila. A righteous
outpouring of people into the streets, a ham- handed, venal government
capitulates and a new day is born.
But it is never as simple as breathless broadcasts might paint it. To understand the fall of Slobodan Milosevic, it is important to understand the manner in which he fell. The truth in Yugoslavia lies somewhere between the grand aesthetic of the public drama and the more mundane details of deal making. Indeed, the latter is frequently more defining than the former. And many disappointed expectations are rooted in details overlooked by revolution's glamour.
The roots of Milosevic's demise can be traced to the frustration of the American and British governments, enmeshed in the realities of peacekeeping in Kosovo, with no hope of conclusion. NATO was trapped in a quagmire without exit. In Belgrade, the opposition failed, divided, and were discredited as agents of NATO, all against a backdrop of Serb victimization.
Everyday Serbs were convinced of two things: They had not committed atrocities, and they themselves were the targets of an unjust bombing campaign. Milosevic was the great beneficiary. He might have been a swine, but he was Serbia's swine. Incompetent on many fronts, he at least defended the national interest. In this context, the opposition had as much chance of winning as Quisling had of carrying Norway in World War II.
The United States reacted with a new strategy. Described in "Toppling Milosevic: The Carrot Instead of the Stick," the new strategy consisted of splitting Milosevic from his followers. Cracks opened but were contained when Milosevic called for elections. But before the election it became clear Milosevic had nearly trapped himself, as recounted in "Checkmate in Yugoslavia,".
Milosevic's Cabinet, his cronies and the army and police held the key to the drama. Milosevic had to be isolated from those levers of power before the crowds could storm parliament. Thousands could have been killed, as they were in Romania with the fall of Ceaucescu. Milosevic might cling to power.
It was imperative the leadership split from Milosevic and accommodate Kostunica. Public displays of police suddenly embracing demonstrators probably had less to do with the passions of the moment than with fevered deals being made between Kostunica and former Milosevic followers. These deals brought both the peace and the revolution.
The deals also created a revolution with a complex genesis and an uncertain future. Milosevic is certainly gone. The temptation among many, including his closest followers, is to blame everything on him. The head of the international war crimes tribunal in the Hague has made it clear Milosevic should be tried for war crimes, but Kostunica has made it clear he does not want to see prosecution proceed.
As president, he might be able to stomach Milosevic's trial, but many of the people he and the United States had to deal with over the past few months are also subject to indictment and trial. They would not have been as cooperative had Kostunica and likely the United States not made guarantees about their legal status. Given the example of former President Augusto Pinochet of Chile, it seems probable that any world-wise operators asked for promises.
As important as the status of charges against Milosevic followers, is the issue of Serbian territorial claims, particularly in Kosovo. Kostunica was an adamant supporter of Serbian claims in Kosovo. What did the United States promise Kostunica? Indeed, how long can Kostunica survive without some movement on Kosovo? And what will Albanians do about the new darling of the West?
Kostunica himself remains an enigma. The West would like to turn him into another Vaclav Havel. He is not a communist, but he is not a liberal either. He is a nationalist who, like the rest of Serbia, has viewed the West with suspicion. He has also created a coalition of diverse elements, including former Milosevic supporters who hope to retain their influence, if not their position.
It is reasonable to say Kostunica is a snapshot of Serbia today: tired of Milosevic, deeply suspicious and resentful of the West, nationalistic to the very bone. Kostunica is formally democratic, but he understands the complex personalism and clannishness that comprise Balkan culture. No Havel, Kostunica is a hardline nationalist who has come to power partly by accommodating his public enemies.
The fall of Milosevic gives the West the opportunity to wash its hands of the mess. But trying to wash hands and actually washing them are different things. The West now finds itself in a position in which it must support a political figure financially and politically. The problem is that political figure has certain interests that will likely be anathema. If the West does not support him, it loses credibility. If it does, it can wind up supporting the very perspectives that helped lead to war in the first place.
This is what the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo will fear most. They see Kostunica as the West's excuse to abandon the Albanians to the Serbs once again. And, indeed, that might be the case. Washington, weary of the mess, may well declare victory and go home.
(c) 2000 Stratfor, Inc.
Carl
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