Anyway my point is that if it is wrong for Habermas to postulate an ideal that would not motivate then it would be wrong for Rawls to do so as well. Does this mean you also reject Rawl's original position? And to run your favorite modus tollens. If it is not wrong for Rawls it can hardly be wrong for Habermas.
I find the emphasis upon process and formal aspects of normative discourse odd. Is this all tied to Kohlberg's "empirical" studies of stages of moral development? If you buy into that than you are claiming that some of the greatest moral philosophers are stuck at a lower stage of development since many were ethical egoists.
I have always thought of ethics as being grounded in the idea that humans have certain requirements to flourish. THere is such a thing as the welfare and illfare of humans. What advances our welfare we call good, what does not, bad. Most of us have an interest in the welfare of others as well as our own, or even if we dont the welfare of others is often a condition of our own. This gives us the motivation and reasons to be moral. But it is also true that our views on how the welfare and illfare of humans is to be advanced will be considerably influenced by our class and other relationships to society at large.
Cheers, Ken Hanly
----- Original Message ----- From: Justin Schwartz <jkschw at hotmail.com> To: <lbo-talk at lists.panix.com> Sent: Tuesday, July 31, 2001 12:29 PM Subject: Re: Ethical foundations of the left
>
> >
> >>First, my problem is that justification by reference to an ideal state
of
> >>affairs will fail to motivate people in the here and now, where
conditions
> >>are not ideal.
> >
> >The rejoinder would be, we always already presuppose this ideal, or some
> >such approximation of this idea, whenever we speak. The ideal does not
> >motivate, it is the equivalent, I think, of a Kantian postulate.
>
> OK, if the ideal does not motivate, then what force does it have? Sounds
> like you have to reject "ought implies can," and argue that people somehow
> ought to have motivations that they would have under ideal circumstances,
> but don;t have because circumstances are not ideal. WOrse, what makes it
an
> idea;?
>
> You say, we presuppose it--actuallly, here and how. How? Because our
> communication is distorted by power if we don't? But, as Carol noted,
> "distorted" presupposes a norm, and the question here is whether the fact
> that communication occurs under certain conditions described in the ideal
> speech situation has any normative force.
>
> >What
> >motivates people are their interests: self-preservation, desire,
emotions,
> >feelings, affections, reasons and so on. Habermas argues we can
distinguish
> >between two kinds of interests: an interest in understanding and an
> >interest in mastery. One is practical, the other is technical. It is our
> >interest in these two things that motivate us to learn, not the
> >idealizations that we make. The idealizations, in effect, are the simple
> >'assumption' that when we try to understand or mastery something, we
assume
> >that it is possible.
>
> OK, but it's obviously possible for masters to communicate with slaves and
> vice versa, without any ideal conditions obtaining. ("Build me a pyramid!"
> "Yes, boss.") If we wish to explain communication of this sort, how is the
> ISS the least bit illuminating?
>
> --jks
>
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