it's pretty straightfoward. you have a recipe that says you can make this nice lemon pudding. yum! but, pudding doesn't always come out properly. and you can't really tell, can you, until you actually _make_ it and eat it.
traditionally, as i suggested in a post "on navels", people argued for a "copy theory" in which the difference b/t the two could be judged by how well an explanation, theory, etc 'mirrored' reality. it was argued that we get closer and closer to the truth by the progressive development of scientific inquiry.
see also: the distinction between "political" and "ideological" http://nuance.dhs.org/lbo-talk/9911/2308.html
from a long ago exch. between charles/kelley:
truth of the pudding is in the eating: it's not whether we can *make* the pudding with the application of some theory but in the eating and enjoyment of it --a kind of use, of course, but the metaphor is richer i think. so for ex, you can often actually make a pudding and it might look just fine, but it tastes awful. actually, this happens when i bake bread; don't make pudding altogether that much ;). it usually tastes good, but there are just some days when it's much better than it is other days. (though i wouldn't want to suggest that it's all arbitrary; i mean that things like the kind of flour used, the yeast, the temp and humidity that day make a difference)
> >Another rarely mentioned and somewhat counter intuitive angle is that the
>SOCIAL >is the objective. This is true in natural as well as social
>science, because natural >scientists demand repeatability of results, i.e.
>a social confirmation of objectivity. >This comports with the basic
>principle of materialism that there is an objective reality >outside of our
>individual thought. We confirm its objectivity by communication with
> >others or socially. (Charles Brown)
well actually, no, this is used quite a bit. there are a few problems with it though: people also agree on ideology so agreement doesn't necessarily bring us closer to objectivity. also what kind of 'community context' supports this confirmation: within the institutions we have today, that sort of utopian dream has degenerated into dystopia--surely. LBO can be a place where the same antics take place.
an interesting discussion of this problem is in Sandra Harding's _Whose Science, Whose Knowledge" Harding points out that it's important to ensure that the community of scholars is diverse because this affects the production of knowledge. However, Harding is careful to point out that the historically oppressed have no access to the truth simply by virtue of their social location. yes, i know you object to this, and draw on a dialectical conception of knowledge and political practice. however, it's not clear that this is persuasive--at least not what i see happen in actual practice, to wit: we need look no further than this list.
another point re a 'community of scholars': to what extent does the fact that i'm even reiterating the above claims point to the possibility that a community of scholars as a form of validating the objectivity of scientific claims an operable one? that is, i've explained my position on these issues at least three times in this space, to you specifically. what does it tell us that we don't remember, perhaps don't listen, and so forth? so, i've decided to just save them from now on and post and repost. HAH! ahhh well, chaz, just fallible human beings i guess....
<...> so, from the pragmatist tradition, engaged fallibilistic pluralism:
1. requires responsibility for taking our fallibility seriously. we must be committed to our reasoned argument, but willing to listen to others. and we must be willing to listen without denying the otherness of those others.
2. respecting and listening to others would require that we avoid relentlessly translating what they say into our own all too familiar vocabularies
3. it would demand that we don't condemn their voices as too obscure or trivial (butler thread ring a bell here?)
4. embracing the fact that there is no firm foundational ground to stand on. there are no safe, rationalized procedures to fall back on in order to adjudicate disagreements.
5. i think you recognize that any appeal to a community of scholars is an ethical appeal, a normative ideal.
6. the 'we' of that community is an *achievement* and there is no need for dialogical engagement that requires or demands agreement. we might need to recognize that understanding doesn't preclude disagreement
7. the assumption, then, is that we all have something to contribute and, as such, our duty is to try to understand the other's position in the strongest possible way, rather than searching out their weaknesses, the gaps and fissures in their reasoned positions.