< http://www.iht.com > A Pair of Sober Questions About the Slog After Early Victories Robert A. Levine IHT Friday, December 7, 2001
LOS ANGELES The United States and its coalition partners have good reason to be optimistic about the war on terrorism: They are winning the battle against the Taliban and Qaida. But they also have good reason to be pessimistic. Such short-run victories are not going to wipe out terrorism.
So far, the short run has eclipsed the long, and questions about what might happen after the near-term victories fail to end all threats are not being asked. Two should be:
How do we know if we're succeeding? And what happens after the next major attack?
Near-term optimism seems justified. For once, rather than fighting the last war the American military is apparently doing quite well fighting the current one, blending American strengths with those of the Afghan allies on the ground. Afghanistan is now largely controlled by those allies.
Further, American and other diplomacy does not seem to be doing badly in working on the problems caused by the fact that the Afghan allies are not closely allied with one another.
And the international anti-terrorism coalition, including not only the West but also Muslim and other Asian states and Russia, has held together. Some parts may unravel, but matters seem to be in hand.
It is not clear that Osama bin Laden will be eliminated, but victory in Afghanistan will roll up a major part of the Qaida network, with or without bin Laden. That phrase "with or without," however, begins to delineate the long-run problem. Qaida is not just bin Laden, and terrorism is not just Qaida. Islamic terrorism is organized into a not very hierarchical network of cells. It is in fact a living organism that generates new cells as old ones die. Decimation of Qaida will decrease the size and vigor of the network, and that will be well worth doing, but it will not kill the organism or its regenerative power.
"Success" in the war on terrorism will thus consist in decreasing terrorist events, not in ending them.
We achieved some success in "wars on" of the late 20th century. The wars on the Mafia have greatly reduced its activity, in the United States and in Italy, but it still exists, and other equally criminal networks have replaced it in part; the parallel to Qaida is clear. The war on drugs has confiscated lots of narcotics and convicted many dealers, including higher-ups, but new drugs, channels and bosses have replaced old ones, and it is not certain that the flow has been reduced.
Even the war on terrorism has had many successes. True, the past decade has seen at least three major Islamic terrorist attacks - in addition to the Twin Towers disaster, the attacks on the Al Khobar barracks in Saudi Arabia and on American embassies in Africa. But other major efforts have been foiled - attacks prevented on Los Angeles International Airport and on the United Nations building and multiple bridges, and on eleven airliners. (The first World Trade attack should be counted 50-50. It was intended to be much bigger.)
France has had significant victories. And although the world knows of the attacks that took place, there are likely to have been more that did not which are not widely known.
Suppose that the success rate against terrorism has been 60 percent. Suppose that actions taken since Sept. 11 can raise that even as high as 90 percent. Nonetheless, something in the remaining 10 percent is going to happen, possibly something involving biological, chemical or nuclear/radiological weapons.
When that occurs, how will anyone know that security has been increased from 60 to 90? Operationally, how will anyone know that the steps taken since Sept. 11 have largely worked, and should not be thrown out so we can start all over again?
Which leads to the second question: What happens after the next terrible event? For those who value civil liberties, the policies instituted in the United States since Sept. 11 have not been reassuring. Extended wiretapping, indefinite detention and star chamber military trials are disquieting. They have apparently been accepted by a majority, at least as applied to aliens of Arab origins.
Suppose the next attack kills some multiple of the Sept. 11 victims. Will the next steps curtail the constitutional rights of citizens as well? Will the United States move to the Israeli expedient of an eye for an eye? It has not worked in Israel, but the emotional need for it is understandable, as is the Palestinian counter-reaction.
At some point, the United States and other democratic nations may face the horrifying choice between extreme terrorism and unprecedented curtailing of liberties. Or worse yet, both, since the curtailing is not likely to reduce terrorism.
The outcome is unclear. It may become clearer, and better, if we start thinking about it. The writer, an economist, defense analyst and former official in the U.S. executive and legislative branches, contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.