WHAT IS TO BE UNDONE? A RUSSIA POLICY AGENDA FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION The Nixon Center (www.nixoncenter.org) February 2001
Foreword
America's relations with post-Communist Russia have posed a special intellectual challenge. Once the great ideological and moral contest with the Soviet Union was ended, and so successfully, many Americans tended to assume that Russia would, first of all, evolve easily into a democracy and, second, be a natural friend of the United States. Instead, U.S.-Russia relations have reverted to what is in fact more normal in history, namely a relationship between two major powers whose national interests sometimes are parallel and sometimes do not coincide, even if there are no bitter conflicts.
It should be possible to manage this relationship in the coming years, and to turn it into a positive contribution to international order. This requires of the United States that it have a clear sense of its own priorities-focused less on personalities and more on Russian actions, less on internal politics that we cannot affect and more on Russian foreign policies that affect us.
This is the contribution of The Nixon Center's report on Russia. Its recommendations, as well as its tone, are constructive even while being sober and realistic. It offers an excellent concise analysis of the recent problems in the relationship, as well as valuable proposals.
HENRY A. KISSINGER HONORARY CHAIRMAN THE NIXON CENTER
Introductory Note
This report represents a collaborative effort by members of The Nixon Center's Board and staff to outline a new American policy agenda toward Russia, both to ensure a decisive break from failed policies and to focus U.S. attention on changing priorities in our relations with Moscow.
We are most grateful to several members of the Center's Board of Directors who offered ideas and extensive comments for the report. They are: Robert Ellsworth, Vice Chairman of the Center and a former Deputy Secretary of Defense and U.S. Ambassador to NATO; Maurice R. Greenberg, Chairman of the Center and Chairman and CEO of American International Group; Henry Kissinger, Honorary Chairman of the Center and a former Secretary of State; Eugene K. Lawson, President of the U.S.-Russia Business Council and former Vice Chairman of the Export-Import Bank; James Schlesinger, Chairman of the Center's Advisory Council and a former Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy; and Brent Scowcroft, President of the Forum for International Policy and a former National Security Advisor.
Nixon Center Director Paul Saunders was the principal drafter of the report. Members of the Center's senior staff-including Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs, David M. Lampton, Director of Chinese Studies, Peter W. Rodman, Director of National Security Programs, and myself-wrote sections of the report and made other substantive contributions.
Needless to say, since the report is the product of a group effort, each of the advisors and contributors does not necessarily agree with every word of the text.
DIMITRI K. SIMES PRESIDENT THE NIXON CENTER
Executive Summary
Russia's disturbing domestic evolution, and changes in the international system, have rendered America's recent agenda toward Russia increasingly obsolete. Defining a new agenda for U.S.-Russian relations requires a clearer definition of U.S. interests and priorities. The Clinton Administration's inability to do this led to failure and disillusionment. We identify four American priorities:
· to deter Russia from emerging as a spoiler in the international system; · to limit Russia's role in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other sensitive technologies; · to discourage Russia from promoting instability in regions where vital U.S. interests are at stake; and, · to develop an interest-based overall relationship with Russia that would give Russia a stake in cooperation, better serve both American and mutual interests, and encourage Russia to see itself as a part of the West.
In addition to a clearer sense of U.S. priorities, we need a fundamentally different policy approach, which would:
· avoid attempts to micromanage Russian domestic politics; · seek to understand legitimate Russian interests and to respect them when they do not clash with vital American interests or principles; · treat Russia like a "normal" country, whose role in the international system depends on its own progress and conduct rather than its status as a former superpower; and, · strive to restore a bipartisan domestic consensus on policy toward Russia.
On this basis, this report makes eight recommendations for a new American agenda in relations with Russia. They are outlined in detail under the following headings:
1. Preventing Russia's emergence as a spoiler: Russian-Chinese relations: Avoiding, when possible, actions that push Russia closer to China or otherwise contribute to Russian participation in a group of states seeking to limit U.S. power must be among the Bush Administration's top priorities.
2. Proliferation: what are the real dangers? The U.S. should be very firm, but also discriminating, in responding to Russian proliferation. It should be harsh in dealing with concrete threats to the U.S. or regional stability but less concerned about other proliferation such as sales of older conventional weapons.
3. Arms control, national missile defense, and the ABM Treaty: To the extent the U.S. has the technology, the money, and the domestic political will, it should be prepared to deploy national missile defense regardless of Russian views. Ultimately, a deal with Russia on the ABM Treaty is desirable but not strictly necessary; the same is true of further arms reduction agreements, which could be replaced by parallel unilateral reductions after an appropriate review of U.S. requirements.
4. NATO enlargement: While taking into account Russian preferences and the aspirations of potential members, the U.S. should make decisions on enlargement on the basis of what is best for NATO. Both Russia and potential members should be informed that provocative behavior will undermine their respective objectives.
5. The Caspian Basin: The U.S. should let commercial enterprises take the lead in establishing oil and gas pipeline routes in the region. More broadly, America should adopt a two-tiered policy-acknowledging Russia's legitimate interests while deterring its expansionist behavior, and maintaining friendly relations with other post-Soviet states without promising support we are unlikely to deliver.
6. The Russian economy: Since IMF endorsement of Russia's economic plans is required for Paris Club talks on rescheduling $48 billion in Soviet-era debt to proceed, the U.S. should not oppose a stand-by credit. Russia must understand, however, that it will not attract significant foreign investment without living up to its financial obligations and conducting meaningful reform.
7. Bilateral assistance programs: The U.S. should reassess all assistance programs, including soliciting Russian perspectives, with a view to deciding which programs to eliminate quickly and which to cut more slowly. While most Nunn-Lugar programs should be continued, the strengthening of the Russian state suggests that Moscow should be expected to assume gradually increasing responsibility for the security of its nuclear materials.
8. Broader dialogue: Where the Clinton Administration focused on relations with the Russian government (and select figures within it), U.S. policy should seek a substantially broader dialogue with Russian society, opposition political groups, and others. At the same time, there should be no illusion-especially given the apparent nature of the Putin regime-that this approach will enable us to bypass the government or exert significant leverage over it.