Now, I'm not one usually given to agreeing with you on matters theoretical, but I must admit, this seems to have got uncomfortably warmish rather quickly, eh? So, in an altogether more comradely tone ...
>I see know such thing. Dependence presumes a hierarchy which I do not
>understand to be inherent to being human at all. That does not leave
>the only other options Sartre or Rousseau. What about attachment? Why
>would attachment have to be thought as anything to do with dependence?
>Dependence is a product of a range of social institutions. Ways of
>thinking about parent-child relations for example.
Now then; what if I were to define as an instance of 'dependence' Catherine Driscoll's relationship with those elements without which she would not have become who she has become? Or without which she could not have become anything? Or without which she could not currently pursue a human existence? Or without which she could not pursue even a physical one?
Any of those fall under the 'dependence' tag for you? This matters, because, as I'm sure you'll agree, there are a myriad elements (and relationships between them) with which you relate in just such a way - and would be in any setting. Sure, the relationship is mutual to a meaningful extent (guess that's what 'structuration' tries to get at, not to mention the materialist conception of history: us making history in conditions not of our choosing 'n' all), so it'd not be right to posit that lot neatly as the 'independent' variable and 'Catherine Driscoll' simply as the 'dependent' variable (that'd be antihumanist twaddle to my recalcitrantly humanist ear), but that doesn't mean we're not enmeshed by heapsa tendrils of dependence - by definition and in all worlds - does it?
If you agree with that, the next question is, where in that lot does logic dictate these relationships need be hierarchical? THE political question, perhaps ...
Cheers, Rob.