"All identity is social, but class is the quintessence of the social. Unlike race, sex, culture, or place of birth, class cannot be determined except by the positions of the individual in society, and cannot be reproduced except through participation in the functioning of the economic system" (p. 95).
Since class is the quintessence -- the pure, highly concentrated essence -- of the social, it, in contrast to other forms of identity, is fundamental; they, by contrast to class, are epiphenomal. This is not quite the same as the old base-superstructure dualism [class is not presented as purely economic, separate from culture], but it is also not far removed from it, and it certainly posits a social hierarchy, with class reigning supreme and determinative.
Why is class supreme and determinative? BK gives two reasons. First, unlike other forms of identity, class "can not be determined except by the position of individuals in society." This is a somewhat strange formulation, since the best thinking of social class, inside and outside of the Marxist tradition, has always posited is as a relationship, rather than a thing or a location. But on a sympathetic reading, I take BK to be trying to say that class is not an ascribed or given quality, but the product of social dynamics. Second, unlike other forms of identity, class "cannot be reproduced except through participation in the functioning of the economic system." This seems an almost self-evident observation that class is born out of economic, among other, relationships.
What is problematic in this two qualities are not the descriptions/definitions of class, which -- on a charitable reading -- are quite unexceptional. Rather, it is the contrast between class and other forms of social identity. For class to be different than race, gender, sexual orienation, and other forms of social identity, it must be unique and distinctive in these qualities. But is it so? BK seems to be relying on very thin and extraordinarily superficial conceptions of these other forms of social identity, on a rather simple notion of these identities as fixed and ascribed. This flies in the face of the overwhelming weight of work, both theoretical and historical, done on the socio-historical construction of racial, gender and sexual orientation identities, to focus on the more prominent categories. They are every bit as much social phenomenon as class; for example, the very fact that there we give significance to some physical features [skin complexion, facial features, texture of hair], as opposed to others, to establish a category of 'race' makes it clear that it is a social construct, embodied in social relationships, just as class is. And because they are social construct, they -- like class -- are rather fluid and dynamic identities.
Now, Patrick Bond gives as his reading of BK, the notion that the race is mediated by class. Of course, it is, although I don't see quite how he manages to get that out of this quote. But by the same token, and here South Africa is a paradigmatic example, class is mediated by race. If all BK wanted to say was that different social identities mediate each other, such that it is impossible to talk about class, or race, or gender, or sexual orientation, in isolation, as a pure type, surely he could have done so in a much clearer and more direct way. I think, however, that he is clearly positing class as socially determinative in a way no other form of identity or antagonism is, and that he does so without a convincing argument to that end.
Leo Casey United Federation of Teachers 260 Park Avenue South New York, New York 10010-7272 (212-598-6869)
Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never has, and it never will. If there is no struggle, there is no progress. Those who profess to favor freedom, and yet deprecate agitation are men who want crops without plowing the ground. They want rain without thunder and lightning. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its waters. -- Frederick Douglass --
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