Kosova Redux

Seth Ackerman SAckerman at FAIR.org
Mon Jan 29 17:01:02 PST 2001


Michael Pugliese wrote:


> Boiling down Seth's points.
>
These aren't my points. These are the views of the U.S. State Department, as manifested in their European progaganda service. I'm not attributing them to anyone on this list, certainly not you, Michael.


> 1) Kostunica as bad as Milosevic? Someone who
> translated the Federalist Papers and got thrown off a law faculty in '74
> has
> more honor in his toenails than Milosevic and co. have in
> their entire being.
>
Don't believe me? Read this item from RFE/RL:

http://www.rferl.org/balkan-report/2000/12/90-221200.html

December 22, 2000 The Heart Of The Matter. In its haste to welcome Serbia back into the fold, the international community may be losing sight of two broader trends in the Balkans. Ignoring those processes could help foster renewed conflict in the region. The kudos and accolades from the international community for Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica and his allies in the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition are likely to reach new heights in the coming days and weeks if, as expected, the DOS sweeps all before it in the 23 December Serbian parliamentary elections. The eager embrace of the DOS may prove embarrassing at some point if the coalition degenerates into in-fighting and has trouble getting its act together in governing (see "RFE/RL Balkan Report," 1 December 2000). But for now, the aid and praise continue, as if the defeat of the old regime on Saturday will ban the specter of aggressive nationalism from Serbia and make it a "normal country" once again. Perhaps those who believe this should take a second look. In recent days, Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic has raised the idea of an international conference that would secure foreign backing for keeping Kosova inside Yugoslavia despite the clearly stated wish of its 90 percent ethnic Albanian majority for independence (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 18 December 2000). Kostunica himself has called for the revision of the 1999 Kumanovo agreements that ended the conflict in Kosova. He has, moreover, talked about the need the "cleanse" the demilitarized zone of "terrorists." His ally, Vladan Batic, has warned that Belgrade will "take things into its own hands and clean out the terrorists from every inch of its territory" if the foreigners do not do the job (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 19 and 20 December 2000). These remarks recall some frequently heard during the rule of Slobodan Milosevic, and even those from Radical Party leader Vojislav Seselj himself. Like the old regime, the new one seems to have difficulty in accepting that Serbia might expect to lose some territory after starting and losing four wars. Similarly, like Milosevic, some in the DOS feel uncomfortable with the idea that some Serbs just might find themselves in a state in which they are not the dominant nationality. This was precisely the main issue on which Milosevic justified his war against Croatia in 1990-1991. In fact, what is going on now in Kosova and Montenegro is but a continuation of that process of the disintegration of old Yugoslavia (see "RFE/RL Balkan Report," 28 November 2000). In the long run, any attempts to cajole the Montenegrins into not holding a referendum or not respecting its results, or any attempt at denying the Kosovars independence is as bound to fail as were the pitiful diplomatic efforts nearly a decade ago aimed at keeping Slovenia and Croatia in a federation dominated by Milosevic. This is especially the case where Kosova is concerned. What is going on there is not just a continuation of the disintegration of Tito's state, but also an illustration of a second key process: Kosova is a European example of the post-1945 worldwide process of decolonization. From Bangladesh to Zimbabwe, the watchwords of this process have been self-determination and majority rule. The Kosovar Albanians want those for themselves, and have made this wish clear at the ballot box. They have also made it clear in many ways that Serbia has forfeited its claim to the province after 10 years of apartheid, followed by a brutal and bloody repression (see "RFE/RL Balkan Report," 15 December 2000). If the Kosovars' demands are ignored, one is likely to see a prolonged manifestation of "Albanian separatism and terrorism," the likes of which the Balkans have not seen before. The Albanians, to be sure, must now show that they are ready for and deserving of independence. It will not do to replace one nationalist tyranny with another. Attacks on Serbs and other minorities must stop, as must the export of violence across the border. Kosova needs to become a state based on the rule of law and a state of all its citizens. That's a tall order, but it's never too soon to start. This is the best insurance that borders will become increasingly unimportant and that the peoples of the region will truly become ready to take their place in Euro-Atlantic structures. In this context, one should not pay too much attention to Belgrade's red herring that independence for Kosova will lead to a breakup of Macedonia, the establishment of a greater Albania, and other horrors. The Albanians of Albania, Kosova, and Macedonia are fully aware of the profound cultural and political differences that divide them. Ibrahim Rugova recently told the Montenegrin daily "Pobjeda" specifically that he does not want all Albanians in one state. No major ethnic Albanian party in any Balkan country advocates a greater Albania as a serious political objective (in contrast to some greater Serbian parties). And one need not worry about the breakup of Macedonia so long as it truly becomes a state of all its people and based on rule of law. (Patrick Moore)


> 3)Bernard Kouchner, ignoring the Kosovars? Chirac? J. Fischer? I don't
> think
> so.
>
Oh, but look behind the rhetoric. The Europeans are terrified of a renewed Albanian war of independence and Greater Albania. This is causing all sorts of behind-the-scenes rifts with the US. The Europeans think the US is coddling the KLA, not cracking down hard enough on the separatists in Southern Serbia, and isn't serious about enforcing the UN resolution requiring Kosovo to stay in Yugoslavia.


> 4) EU military force?
> Well if the Europeans had got their act together and gave the finger to
> NATO
> and the Pentagon in the early 90's when Bosnian Muslims were being
> slaughtered by the Karazdic forces in the Bosnian Serb paras maybe alot of
> civilians would have lived. Maybe not the 200,000 that died but, some.
> Here
> is the weak point of the pacifist/anti-imperialist case.
>
I don't want to wander back into this thicket again, lest we irritate Doug. But it's worth pointing out that your argument can be turned precisely on its head. You're saying Europe could have saved Bosnian lives by choosing to intervene militarily in Bosnia without the US/NATO in the early 90's, instead of diplomaticly dithering until the US came to the rescue in 1994-95.

But I'm saying the US could have saved all these Bosnian lives by not sabotaging the Europeans' diplomacy in the early 90's. Here is the central irony of all the arguments over Bosnia: The European-sponsored diplomatic proposals that were so vigorously denounced in the early 90's as appeasing Serbian aggression -- they were all *more* favorable to the Muslims than the 1995 Dayton Accords, which were the outcome of the Americans' supposedly "tough-minded" military approach.

The only reason the US opposed these European plans -- the 1992 Lisbon plan, various Vance-Owen proposals -- is that they were "European." Their success would undermine NATO to the advantage of the EU. As Paul Gebhard, the Clinton administration's Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy at the time, later wrote, the US was criticizing European plans to create:

"a European Security and Defence Identity in the WEU outside NATO. US criticism of European institutions, however, can only be credible if European policies are unsuccessful...

The EC claimed the lead in setting Western policy at the start of the Yugoslav crisis...The Europeans may have thought that [Cyrus] Vance's participation as the US representative was sufficient to commit the US to whatever policy developed. By having a former Secretary of State on the team, they may have expected to bring the US into the negotiations without having to work with officials in Washington. This approach reflects a desire in European capitals for 'Europe' to set the political agenda without official US participation on issues of European security...

Vance and Owen argued that the deal.....was the best that could be crafted (implying that US participation would not have produced a better deal for the Muslims)...[But] without its participation, the Clinton administration was not committed politically to the plan....."

To repeat, the Vance-Owen plan would have given the Bosnian Muslims *more* territory and the Bosnian Serbs *less* territory than Dayton ultimately did. But the Clinton administration blocked it, claiming publicly that it rewarded aggression but privately concerned about the issues Gebhard describes above. 200,000 dead Bosnians later, the US got its way and Dayton was signed. I don't see how this history helps the interventionist side at all.

Seth



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