zionism

[Seth Ackerman]

Brad Delong wrote:

> It still strikes me as very strange. According to people who ought to 
> know, Bush offered Saddam Hussein the resolution of all prewar oil 
> drilling disputes on Iraqi terms, plus a bunch of money in return for 
> the peaceful Iraqi evacuation of Kuwait. But Saddam Hussein believed 
> that he had a dominating interest in being seen to stand up to the 
> U.S. in a military confrontation (even if he lost decisively) and 
> Bush believed that he had a dominating interest in demonstrating 
> America's military power...
.

Gee whiz.  

That's approximately the exact opposite of what actually happened. Here's a
useful summary of pre-Gulf War diplomacy, by Noam Chomsky:

---

On August 22 [1990], New York Times chief diplomatic correspondent Thomas
Friedman outlined the Administration position: the "diplomatic track" must
be blocked, or negotiations might "defuse the crisis" at the cost of "a few
token gains" for Iraq, perhaps "a Kuwaiti island or minor border
adjustments." A week later, Knut Royce revealed in Newsday that a proposal
in just those terms had been offered by Iraq, but was dismissed by the
Administration (and suppressed by the Times, as it quietly conceded). The
proposal, regarded as "serious" and "negotiable" by a State Department
Mideast expert, called for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait in exchange for
access to the Gulf (meaning control over two uninhabited mudflats that had
been assigned to Kuwait in the imperial settlement, leaving Iraq landlocked)
and Iraqi control of the Rumailah oil field, about 95% in Iraq, extending
two miles into Kuwait over an unsettled border. 

Investigative reporter Robert Parry adds further details. The offer, relayed
via Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Nizar Hamdoon, reached Washington on
August 9. According to a confidential Congressional summary, it represented
the views of Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leaders. On August 10, the
proposal was brought to the National Security Council, which rejected it as
"already moving against policy," according to the retired Army officer who
arranged the meeting. Former CIA chief Richard Helms attempted to carry the
initiative further, but got nowhere. Further efforts by Hamdoon, the Iraqi
Embassy in Washington, and US interlocuters elicited no response. "There was
nothing in this [peace initiative] that interested the US government," Helms
said. A Congressional summary, with an input from intelligence, concludes
that a diplomatic solution might have been possible at that time. That we
will never know. Washington feared that it was possible, and took no
chances, for the reasons expressed through the Times diplomatic
correspondent. 

>From the outset, the US position was clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal: no
outcome will be tolerated other than capitulation to force. Others continued
to pursue diplomatic efforts. On January 2, US officials disclosed an Iraqi
proposal to withdraw in return for agreement of an unspecified nature on the
Palestinian problem and weapons of mass destruction. US officials described
the offer as "interesting" because it mentioned no border issues, taking it
to "signal Iraqi interest in a negotiated settlement." A State Department
Mideast expert described it as a "serious prenegotiation position." The
facts were again reported by Knut Royce of Newsday, who observed that
Washington "immediately dismissed the proposal." A Times report the next day
suggested that mere statement by the Security Council of an intention to
deal with the two "linked" issues might have sufficed for complete Iraqi
withdrawal from Kuwait. Again, the US was taking no chances, and quashed the
threat at once.29 The story continued. On the eve of the air war, the US and
UK announced that they would veto a French proposal for immediate Iraqi
withdrawal in exchange for a meaningless Security Council statement on a
possible future conference; Iraq then rejected the proposal as well. On
February 15, Iraq offered to withdraw completely from Kuwait, stating that
the withdrawal "should be linked" to Israeli withdrawal from the occupied
territories and Lebanon, in accord with UN resolutions. The Iraqi Ambassador
to the UN stated that the offer was unconditional, and that the terms cited
were "issues" that should be addressed, not "conditions" involving
"linkage." The State Department version, published in the New York Times and
elsewhere, mistranslated the Iraqi offer, giving the wording: "Israel must
withdraw..." Washington at once rejected the offer, and the Ambassador's
comments, which were barely noted in the press, were ignored. The US
insisted that Iraqi withdrawal must precede a cease-fire; Iraqi forces must
leave their bunkers and be smashed to pieces, after which the US might
consider a cease-fire. The media seemed to consider this quite reasonable.30


Washington's plan was to launch the ground operation on February 23.
Problems arose when the Soviet Union, a day earlier, reached an agreement
with Iraq to withdraw if UN resolutions would then be cancelled. The
President, "having concluded that the Soviet diplomacy was getting out of
hand" (as the Times puts it), brusquely dismissed the final Soviet-Iraq
agreement, quickly changing the topic to the charge of an Iraqi
"scorched-earth policy." Again, the crucial difference between the two
positions had to do with timing: should Iraq withdraw one day after a
cease-fire, as the Soviet-Iraqi proposal stated, or while the bombing
continued, as the US demanded.31