Brad DeLong wrote:
> Primary sources? Chomsky's take on reality is... weird.
>
.
Well, all the primary sources are listed there.
But, hey - you don't like Chomsky? How about Bob Woodward? (Remember, I'm all about pragmatism and reasonable compromise!)
Seth
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...from The Commanders by Bob Woodward, 1999:
While Bush has co-authored a book on foreign policy decisions with Scowcroft, the former president has not written his memoirs and says he has no plans to do so. But private dictated entries from Bush's diary were obtained from the records of Joseph diGenova, who served as an independent counsel investigating the mini-scandal that became known as Passportgate. They are quoted here for the first time.
[...]
In January 1991, Bush met with his national security team to discuss what to do about Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait the previous August.
"So if he gets out without a war, that's okay?" Bush asked his chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell.
"Yes, sir," Powell replied. That was the goal of both the United States and the United Nations -- Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. If there was no war, no U.S. servicemen would be killed, Powell stated, speaking like a good military leader looking out for his troops.
Secretary of State James A. Baker III, a talented, ambitious close friend from Texas and a subtle rival of the president's, said he agreed. Baker wanted to bring home victory through diplomacy. If he could negotiate an Iraqi withdrawal, it would be a monumental personal achievement.
Next Bush and Scowcroft, almost together, jumped on Powell and Baker.
"Don't you realize that if he pulls out, it will be impossible for us to stay?" Scowcroft asked. Bush nodded in agreement as Scowcroft spoke. The massive U.S. force -- 500,000 troops in all -- could not remain in the region indefinitely, Scowcroft said. It would be politically and logistically impossible -- and politically insupportable in the United States -- to keep the troops there for an extended period. The nightmare would be for Saddam to pull out of Kuwait and move back into Iraq but stay on the border. His army could wait indefinitely, threatening to invade again. The allied coalition needed the chance to destroy Saddam's army or at least to devastate it so it would not be a threat in the near future.
It was sobering, the president agreed, the most sobering reality of the crisis. He had to play all the diplomatic cards. But, he made clear, a diplomatic solution would in fact bring about a larger crisis. Looking squarely at his advisers, the president said plainly, "We have to have a war."
Scowcroft was aware that this understanding could never be stated publicly or be permitted to leak out. Americans were peacemakers, not warmongers. An American president who declared the necessity of war would probably be thrown out of office. But the president's words reflected the stark reality of the gulf confrontation.