How, if at all does your view of ethics differ from the views of non-cognitivists like Ayer or Stevenson, or that of prescriptivists such as Hare?
Earlier, you asserted that you were a realist concerning ethics, yet your view of moral argument would seem to differ little from that of Ayer, who as I recall, argued in *The Central Questions of Philosophy*, that he failed to see what difference it would make if realism was true or not
Jim F.
On Mon, 23 Jul 2001 19:39:07 +0000 "Justin Schwartz" <jkschw at hotmail.com>
writes:
> I don't go in for this Habermasian metaphysics (sorry, Kells!). Your
>
> argument proves too much. It's also uniquely human to baffle each
> other (and
> ourselves) with bullshit or blind each other with razzle-dazzle. And
> to
> appeal to each other's sympathies, to move each other emotionally,
> to make
> rhetorical appeals, etc. And these latter may be more powerful
> motivationally. King's I Have A Dream Speech expresses a vision, not
> an
> argument, and it had more good effect (in less time) than the
> collected
> ethical writings of Kant. You misunderstand me if you think I say
> argument
> doesn't matter. What I said, rather, is that it doesn't _motivate._
> That's
> why I'm sort of a Humean. Reason is the slave of the passions,
> whether or
> not it ought to be. And I'm talkinga bout fundamentals. Of course
> peiole get
> persuaded about means and about peripheral matters all the time, and
> even in
> ways that affect your behavior.
>
> --jks
>
>
> >At 06:29 PM 7/23/01 +0000, you wrote:
> >
> >>I think I am morte Humean, or Marxian, or something. I think you
> have
> >>exaggerated faith in the persuasive and motivational powers of
> mere
> >>ratiocination.
> >
> >It isn't faith, other than arguing with one another - other than
> reaching
> >understanding, there is no way to have a relationship with another
> person.
> >It isn't about motivation or persuasion, in a sense... it is about
> the very
> >constitution of who we are as human beings. Is all language just
> >self-assertion? This does not account for how a self comes to be a
> self,
> >which is a learning and developmental process. In the assertive
> model, the
> >idea of internalization becomes problematic... If we maintain the
> extreme
> >thesis that all linguistic utterances are assertive, then we are
> left with
> >an extraordinary deficient understanding of
> cognitive-social-psychological
> >development (which there is a great deal of support for). In short:
> >persuasion is the means through which human coexistence is conduct.
> Even
> >enemies relate to one another (you have to know you enemy to hate
> them
> >properly [and effectively]!). This implies that, as linguistically
> bound
> >creatures, we are, for all intents and purposes, doomed to
> communicate. In
> >many respects, we can't even choose to be or not to be rational, we
> just
> >are. Language is oriented by truth, and this can be brought to a
> >propositional level through argumentation. We can give up on
> theory, that's
> >fine, but this has more to do with knowing that we can know
> something and
> >then backing away from it in any event, which is a motivation
> question...
> >which can only be understood by communicating with one another...
> and so
> >on. A sheerly strategic life cannot be lived.
> >
> >> I believe in ratiocination, and I even enjoy it. I hope to hold
> true
> >>beliefs, and think that thinking about them is the only way to be
> as sure
> >>as one can that they are true--in general. There are, however,
> fixed
> >>points, like one I mentioned (freedom is better than slavery);
> sure, I
> >>might come up with a brilliant argument to show why. But I am
> more
> >>confident in the conclusion that I am in any argument I could give
> for
> >>it. To quote myself, I think using this very example: explanations
> can
> >>only illuminate these truths. We will take then in the dark if we
> have
> >>to. Might we be wrong? Yes, about them or anything. C'est la vie.
> Anyway,
> >>I think we have reached an impasse, here. Better stop unless we
> have
> >>something new to say.
> >
> >You can't use an argument to demonstrate that arguments don't
> persuade
> >people. I mean, you can, but it doesn't make much sense. If I
> accept your
> >argument, that a good argument for arguments cannot be made, I'm a
> logical
> >idiot. So I don't accept it, and you'll have to give reasons, or
> hit me
> >over the head with something (which just means you'll have to argue
> with
> >someone else, or perhaps barter, for an appropriate object) to
> dissuade me
> >otherwise. In any event, reasoning is what we have at our disposal,
> there
> >is no point in tossing it away simply because convincing people -
> arguing -
> >is a painstaking task (and I've noted that you agree here). We
> people sit
> >down together to organize a protest, they are all (for the most
> part)
> >interested in the most effective means of success. I'm sure that
> arguments
> >/ reasons have a tremendous weight in these situations. Likewise,
> when
> >you're trying to fix up the apartment, you give reasons for why you
> want
> >the desk in the blue room instead of the red room, it might be
> trivial, but
> >if we're going to live together, that's how it gets done. And,
> through some
> >sort of weak messianic power, we an agreement is actually reached,
> there is
> >a sense of communicative gratification: that something one has
> struggled
> >for, through action and thought, has been realized. It might suck
> to see
> >happiness as a result of communicative / successful understanding,
> but
> >after that - you pull out the wine, the chocolates... and take a
> stroll
> >on... well, wherever!
> >
> >To drapes this a little less intimate.. if there is a 'Leftist'
> ethic, then
> >this is it: it is ground immanently in the experience of
> intersubjective
> >interaction. We can argue about whether or not this can be turned
> into a
> >principle of discourse or something like that, but to some degree,
> the fact
> >of reason is manifest in the process of understanding, which is
> essential
> >not only to our lives, but also to of immediate perceptual
> consciousness.
> >This is most richly developed in a communicative ethics, whereby
> >communication can be understood as communication only under
> specific
> >material and social circumstances. If we're going to chat,
> domination
> >*must* be eliminated, otherwise anything communicated cannot be
> said
> >without suspicious of being ideology / false consciousness and so
> on. It
> >might be a bit of a stretch to say that from our very first word
> we
> >presuppose a universal discursive moral theory... but...
> >
> >hugs,
> >ken
> >
>
>
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