>>At 09:01 PM 7/24/01 -0500, you wrote:
>>>But if all you mean is that good arguments (philosophical or otherwise) do
>>>not convince people who hold intuitions contradictory to the conclusion why
>>>not say that?
>
>Well, I have been saying that. It's been my point, that Kenneth and Luke
>have been resisting, that philosophical argument doesn't persuade people.
>I'm not a relativist, so I don't think that just because people disagree
>means everyone's right, or a skeptic, so I don't think that disagreement
>means everyone's wrong. I think there may be right answers about many
>philosophical questions. I even think that argument can tel; us what they
>are. But I note it as a fact that argument rarely persuades people that
>their own cherished views are wrong.
And my point has been that arguments don't persuade people if, and only if, the conditions for argumentation have not been met. In other words, if one person is committed to figuring something out with another person, and the other person is just joking around, then the conditions for an argument do not exist, in other words: there can be no argument without the appropriate conditions for argumentation. Although this is circular, to some degree, it isn't a vicious circle because there lies the possibility of theoretically articulating the objective conditions that must exist for argumentation. My point, in contrast, has been that even if people don't want to criticize or submit their beliefs to criticism, there is, at some point - in everyday life - times when they will need *reliable* information. For instance, if one wants to learn to eat a lobster. One has to genuinely engage in a process of understanding about how to take the damn shell off without making a mess... and so on.
>The fact that an argument may not be
>>>pragmatically
>>>useful in convincing someone with strong intuitions opposed to the
>>>conclusion tells only against its pragmatic usefulness in these
>>>circumstances.
>
>This is the point I have been hammering on. Bingo! You don't argue with
>George W. Bush to persude him of the error of his way. You mobilize
>opposition to him by ridicule, rhetoric, inspiration, vision, and
>intimidate or defeat him. It';s very un-Habermasian, an ethical ideal
>which might be appropriate for the communist paradise, but not for the
>real world of capitalist class struggle.
We're not in disagreement here. Opposition to the existing political regime is necessary *because* the conditions for reciprocal dialogue do not exist. But we presuppose the validity of reciprocal dialogue when we move into strategic actions. Resistance to oppression is organized drawing on the mutual understanding and reciprocity of the participants. In effect, communication action is a necessary requirement of social protest. To oppose people who aren't interested in dialogue, and who actively seek to distort and destroy time and space for argumentation, is Habermas's point. The case being, it is *really* nasty to plan a revolution based on the idea that once you get into power you're simply going to silence any dissent - there could be no widespread support for such an endeavour - no motivating power aside from the immediate participants who stand to gain from such a grab (a certain degree of communism, I would imagine, is essential for the conditions required for argumentation and reciprocal understanding?). This kind of activity is, obviously, elitist, and should probably be the subject of the harshest criticism. However, such criticism can, and often is, misplaced, since what might rhetorically be the case ("kill the rich") is probably not coincidental with the actual intentions of, say, anarchist protestors. It would be the aim of the status quo to lure protestors, for instance, into an elitist position precisely to strategically dissuade widespread participation. Likewise, it is in the interest of liberalism to grant resistance movements access to the media, so that the protestors get caught off guard about the extraordinary latitude of the existing regime. This is why - essentially - labour is an important factor. I don't know much about the students revolts during the 60s in Germany, but Habermas pointed out that the student protests had not adequately set up strategic ties to labour, and thus their appeals often ended in rhetoric rather than an experience and analysis of alienation through production (obviously there is going to be exceptions...???). Without knowing the details I could be wrong... but, it seems to me (and this was mentioned to me by a labour organizer here in Toronto), that the protests today are much more integrated than in the 60s, with a broader base and a greater field of support and a wider range of criticism (relatively speaking?)... Of course, I know very little about this, and it is all speculative... and I'm not exactly hopeful, but maybe someone could say more?
cheers, ken