>>>By "intuition" I just mean "something I am strongly inclined to say even
>>>in the face of contrary argument."
>>
>>Doesn't this confuse intuition with dogma?
>
>No, intuition is vaguer and looser. My belief in the external world is not
>a dogma; it can be cashed out in lots of ways. Likewise my belief that
>freedom is betterthan slavery is susceptple to variosu interpretations.
>Besides, "intuition" doesn't have the invidious charge of "dogma." I have
>intuitions, you have dogmas, she's just pigheaded.
A belief would only be dogmatic when there is good reason to change ones beliefs. I tend to think of an intuition as "awaiting further information, but leaning toward..."
>But I have an intuition
>>>that
>>>the external world is independent of my beliefs and desires.
>>
>>This should be too difficult to confirm in communication with others though!
>
>You lost me here.
Would you agree that we can differentiate between an internal state of affairs (subjective), a social state of affairs (intersubjective) and an external state of affairs (objective)? If so, then we have 'validated' the separation of three 'spheres' through which we 'experience' the world, one of them being that there is an external world...
>That's how you use the words, not me.
Fair enough. But in principle we could agree on a lexicon that allows us to communicative, right?
>... there are lots of beliefs one never acts on. I've never till now acted
>on my belief that Ulaan Bator is the capitol of Mongolia, and my action
>consisted in justing expressing the belief.
Right... again, it is worth keeping a distinction (even if we're not going to clarify it now) between facts and norms. UB as cap of M is a factual claim. It isn't really a norm that guides actions... I believe that capital punishment is wrong... is a norm guiding belief, I believe that UB is the cap of M, is belief that, for all intents and purposes, one treats as hypothetical knowledge.
lexically challenged, ken