--jks
>
>>Understanding requires
>>>specific
>>>social conditions, ie. the fact that you aren't beating me over the head.
>>
>>Obviously wrong. As I said, and you agreed, the slave and the slavemaster
>>have shared meanings throughout history. If not, slavery wouldn't work.
>
>Ok. This is the problem. The slave can never know, with certainty, that
>they have shared meanings, because the relation is not reciprocal. In order
>for the possibility of mutual understanding the slave must cease to be a
>slave and the master cease to be the master (ie. back to Hegel).
>
>
>
>>>If you beat me into agreeing that the ball is red, this violates the
>>>condition of reciprocity required for the claim itself.
>>
>>Not at all. Masters have imposed their languages and meanings time out of
>>mind. There are no such conditions of reciprocity as you say, or, because
>>they have not ever obtained, no one has ever understood anyone else. This
>>is, as I said, a reductio.
>
>I would agree, but, as Habermas notes, our relations are relations of
>domination. But, in principle, mutual understanding is possible.If one
>person can understand X, there is no reason in the world to assume that
>another person cannot understand X. This is why MacIntyre's
>incommensurability thesis is wacked. We can't know that worldviews are
>incommensurable *unless* we already understand them, which is a
>contradiction.
>
>>Ie. if there
>>>is
>>>only a single person living on the planet, then the ball can be
>>>anything >the investigator wants it to be. But if there are others, then
>>>the>statement can hold valid only the in the context of
>>>agreement. >Agreement >rests on understanding, and the bridge between the
>>>two is >argumentation.
>>
>>I can't speak to Habermas on this, but you might think about about
>>Wittgenstein's private language argument. W says, on Kripke's reading,
>>that words mean what we intend by them collectively, and not what each
>>individual assigns to them (that is why W denies that there are meanings),
>>but there is no agreement to use them that way, and the convention is not
>>something attained by argument. In might be imposed (though W does not
>>talk about this) by brute force. In history, that is the rule.
>
>But we can't decide about whether or not something is private unless we
>talk with other people and figure that out... (see above).
>
>>>I'm drawing out a potential, immanent to speaking, for the rational
>>>coordination of action. We can go the strategic route or go the
>>>communicative route. However, at some point, we *must* engage in
>>>communicative action for our own well-being, in as fragmented a form as
>>>we
>>>might see fit. We don't have a choice in this, cognition is linked to
>>>language, and this has normative implications.
>>
>>What does this mean, that we will be worse off if we are not free and
>>equal? Does it take a theory of CA to tell us this? You can arrive at this
>>result far more directly, without getting meaning, etc. mixed up.
>
>Well, perhaps there is a connection between sentiment and theory then. It
>doesn't take a theory of CA to suppose that free and equal is better than
>not being free and equal. But it does take a theory of communicative action
>to demonstrate, through reconstruction, how we can actually get out of the
>cycle of violence. Habermas outlines the objective cognitive conditions
>required for collective action that has the capacity to problem solve - on
>an individual and social level. He even points out how these capacities are
>destroyed by the economy and systems of domination. Habermas might be a bit
>obsessed with grounding social theory in a normative core, but the
>alternative is philosophical terrorism: if you cannot ground your critique,
>then criticism is nothing more than a military drill. In this sense,
>Habermas's theory packs the explanatory power that is lacking in other
>disciplines.
>
>>I note you didn't address my point that much (most) of science is about
>>nonactual states of affairs. Maybe your point is that science isn't
>>motivational that way. But isn't it? Sort of depends, right? That is why I
>>gave the global warming example.
>
>Maybe I just didn't have a substantial disagreement. On a really basic
>level, arguments are more persuasive if you can supply reasons. Habermas's
>theory explains why this is the case, he links it up with sociology,
>economics, psychology, philosophy and so on. No, you don't need to read TCA
>to get it - after all, Habermas is simply reconstructing what we already
>know.
>
>ken
>
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