Ethical foundations of the left

Justin Schwartz jkschw at hotmail.com
Fri Jul 27 14:36:39 PDT 2001


This a a jaw-dropping instance of my claim that one person' modus ponebs is another person's modus tollens. Kenneth agrees with me that if Habermas is right, no one has ever understood anyone else, but where I take this as a reduction, he holds out the hope that someday, in a free association of equals, we might understand one other. This shows to me that whatever Habermas, or Ken's Habermas, is on about in understanding is of no interest to the real world. Davidson, Quine, Sellars, Brandon, Chomsky, kahnemann and Twersky, etc., are obviously not interesting in "understanding," whatever it is the inhabitants of the ideal world do when the communicate, but "schmunderstanding" which is what human beings do. Habermas' theory, far from grounding critique, is more savagely nihilistic than any deconstructionism. It says, in terms that cannot escape self-reference, that we cannot understand each other or say anything that has a common meaning. What a nightmare!

--jks


>
>>Understanding requires
>>>specific
>>>social conditions, ie. the fact that you aren't beating me over the head.
>>
>>Obviously wrong. As I said, and you agreed, the slave and the slavemaster
>>have shared meanings throughout history. If not, slavery wouldn't work.
>
>Ok. This is the problem. The slave can never know, with certainty, that
>they have shared meanings, because the relation is not reciprocal. In order
>for the possibility of mutual understanding the slave must cease to be a
>slave and the master cease to be the master (ie. back to Hegel).
>
>
>
>>>If you beat me into agreeing that the ball is red, this violates the
>>>condition of reciprocity required for the claim itself.
>>
>>Not at all. Masters have imposed their languages and meanings time out of
>>mind. There are no such conditions of reciprocity as you say, or, because
>>they have not ever obtained, no one has ever understood anyone else. This
>>is, as I said, a reductio.
>
>I would agree, but, as Habermas notes, our relations are relations of
>domination. But, in principle, mutual understanding is possible.If one
>person can understand X, there is no reason in the world to assume that
>another person cannot understand X. This is why MacIntyre's
>incommensurability thesis is wacked. We can't know that worldviews are
>incommensurable *unless* we already understand them, which is a
>contradiction.
>
>>Ie. if there
>>>is
>>>only a single person living on the planet, then the ball can be
>>>anything >the investigator wants it to be. But if there are others, then
>>>the>statement can hold valid only the in the context of
>>>agreement. >Agreement >rests on understanding, and the bridge between the
>>>two is >argumentation.
>>
>>I can't speak to Habermas on this, but you might think about about
>>Wittgenstein's private language argument. W says, on Kripke's reading,
>>that words mean what we intend by them collectively, and not what each
>>individual assigns to them (that is why W denies that there are meanings),
>>but there is no agreement to use them that way, and the convention is not
>>something attained by argument. In might be imposed (though W does not
>>talk about this) by brute force. In history, that is the rule.
>
>But we can't decide about whether or not something is private unless we
>talk with other people and figure that out... (see above).
>
>>>I'm drawing out a potential, immanent to speaking, for the rational
>>>coordination of action. We can go the strategic route or go the
>>>communicative route. However, at some point, we *must* engage in
>>>communicative action for our own well-being, in as fragmented a form as
>>>we
>>>might see fit. We don't have a choice in this, cognition is linked to
>>>language, and this has normative implications.
>>
>>What does this mean, that we will be worse off if we are not free and
>>equal? Does it take a theory of CA to tell us this? You can arrive at this
>>result far more directly, without getting meaning, etc. mixed up.
>
>Well, perhaps there is a connection between sentiment and theory then. It
>doesn't take a theory of CA to suppose that free and equal is better than
>not being free and equal. But it does take a theory of communicative action
>to demonstrate, through reconstruction, how we can actually get out of the
>cycle of violence. Habermas outlines the objective cognitive conditions
>required for collective action that has the capacity to problem solve - on
>an individual and social level. He even points out how these capacities are
>destroyed by the economy and systems of domination. Habermas might be a bit
>obsessed with grounding social theory in a normative core, but the
>alternative is philosophical terrorism: if you cannot ground your critique,
>then criticism is nothing more than a military drill. In this sense,
>Habermas's theory packs the explanatory power that is lacking in other
>disciplines.
>
>>I note you didn't address my point that much (most) of science is about
>>nonactual states of affairs. Maybe your point is that science isn't
>>motivational that way. But isn't it? Sort of depends, right? That is why I
>>gave the global warming example.
>
>Maybe I just didn't have a substantial disagreement. On a really basic
>level, arguments are more persuasive if you can supply reasons. Habermas's
>theory explains why this is the case, he links it up with sociology,
>economics, psychology, philosophy and so on. No, you don't need to read TCA
>to get it - after all, Habermas is simply reconstructing what we already
>know.
>
>ken
>

_________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp



More information about the lbo-talk mailing list