>I haven't read H on Wittgenstein, but I don't see why H distinguishes
>himself from late W. on this. If we want to understand language, look
>at how it is used to do things in everyday life. It is not a question
>of following rules or any consistent, underlying cognitive principles;
>rather, W argues, any pattern or "meaning" in language is simply and
>completely recognizable in how it is used. --Thus the need for
>systematic empirical studies of how people use language to do things:
>convince, persuade, cajole, plead, argue, justify, ridicule. If we
>ignore the ways in which people actually use language in everyday
>life, we might be able to come up with criteria for the "perfect"
>or "ideal" communicative situation. But what's the point? What
>does it have to do with the world in which we live and use language?
>
>Miles
Ok. Habermas accepts this (I think) but then also examines not just how language is used, but how we use language to coordinate our actions. As you note above, Wittgenstein's study calls for empirical studies of how people use language to do things... but Habermas is calling for study about how we do things using language... it is a question of an 'enlarged mentality' - and Habermas doesn't make any claim to 'read Wittgenstein properly' - he makes it explicit that he's ripping what he wants from people and then setting it to use for his own theoretical purposes... Habermas is, truly, interested in everyday language use. And, the idea of the 'ideal' communicative situation is only and 'idealizing' tendency of language use, it isn't a place or an actual situation, nor does it describe an actual situation - but the logic of communication can be explicated such that the formal conditions of validity / meaning can be outlined. Following Wittgenstein, Habermas goes on to Chomsky's understanding of linguistic competence. He argues that linguistic competence is a semantic concern, but he takes something from this too. He argues that underlying linguistic competence is communicative competence, which deals not only with semantics, but also with performance, communicative performance. Basically, if you combine Wittgenstein, Chomsky, Peirce, Mead and Gadamer on language and understanding and meaning - you get Habermas (with Kant, Hegel, Marx, Popper, Lukacs, Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons thrown in for good measure).
ken