> Ok. Habermas accepts this (I think) but then also examines not just
how
> language is used, but how we use language to coordinate our actions.
As you
> note above, Wittgenstein's study calls for empirical studies of how
people
> use language to do things... but Habermas is calling for study about
how we
> do things using language... it is a question of an 'enlarged
mentality' -
> and Habermas doesn't make any claim to 'read Wittgenstein
properly' - he
> makes it explicit that he's ripping what he wants from people and
then
> setting it to use for his own theoretical purposes... Habermas is,
truly,
> interested in everyday language use. And, the idea of the 'ideal'
> communicative situation is only and 'idealizing' tendency of
language use,
> it isn't a place or an actual situation, nor does it describe an
actual
> situation - but the logic of communication can be explicated such
that the
> formal conditions of validity / meaning can be outlined. Following
> Wittgenstein, Habermas goes on to Chomsky's understanding of
linguistic
> competence. He argues that linguistic competence is a semantic
concern, but
> he takes something from this too. He argues that underlying
linguistic
> competence is communicative competence, which deals not only with
> semantics, but also with performance, communicative performance.
Basically,
> if you combine Wittgenstein, Chomsky, Peirce, Mead and Gadamer on
language
> and understanding and meaning - you get Habermas (with Kant, Hegel,
Marx,
> Popper, Lukacs, Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons thrown in for good
measure).
>
> ken
==========
So what would an H. analysis of the Bonn conference on Greenhouse
mitigation look like; if he were the Phil Jackson giving a half-time
speech to the participants about their communicative strategies, what
would he say? There's a situation that provides a robust 'test case'
and it's all on video. Easy for a CA ethnography of scientific
discourse.....
Ian