Ethical foundations of the left

[Kenneth MacKendrick]

Although I wrote that, and probably not that long ago, I can't stand by it 
today. Habermas does not think that a moral universal can be derived a 
priori, it has to be something that can actually be agreed upon (in 
practice), it is a retroactive justification, not a prescriptive one. 
Habermas point is that we cannot dismiss the possibility of universal 
agreement prior to actual discourse ('communication freeom from 
domination'). Of course, for this discourse to take place, formal 
conditions are necessary. This is only a trivial observation if such 
conditions currently exist. It is not a trivial position if communication 
is, presently, marred and distorted by power, labour practices, or money 
(among other things). I think the question of question begging still looms 
over Habermas's head, but I must admit, I haven't figured out a 'solid' way 
of demonstrating this. I've tried, but I haven't convinced myself or 
Habermasians... so back to coming up with better reasons and better 
arguments...

ken

At 07:03 PM 7/29/01 -0500, you wrote:
>Well some other ken at least agrees that there is a fallacy of begging the
>question: It may be that the other Ken is not talking about the same thing.
>This is all so wordy, abstract, and unclear that I am not sure I have a
>handle on what anyone is saying but a Google search on Habermas ISS brought
>this up.
>(from the lbo-archives)
>     However there is no
>certainty that Habermas here, or the sciences in general,
>have NOT imported aesthetic means (so to speak). Which
>means, Habermas cannot provide a justification of his
>formal pragmatic argument *unless* one already believes
>that such justifications are possible (hence, his question
>begging). In effect, the only people that will agree with
>Habermas are those that share his particular moral
>imaginary (and beg the question with him). In other words
>- a democratic ethos is the backdrop to his logically
>trivial observation about the presuppositions of language.
>They are only presuppositions for people who believe they
>are presuppositions. Remember, Habermas is deriving a
>universalist ethic from this position. My point is only
>this: as a universalist position, it fails. Yes, *I* agree
>that language can be used in such a way that we can reach
>an agreement about something, relatively justified ("strong
>hermeneutics" is a stupid term but one that has been used
>here) and normatively binding. But I already believe in
>the power of reason to sort through these things.
>
>Also if arguing against Habermas means providing support for his position
>then it seems to me this does involve
>rejecting counter evidence in advance. Since it is presupposed that Habermas
>is right that there is a performative contradiction in arguing  against him
>then of course it will follow that the counter arguiment itself supports his
>claim. The evidence, the counter argument supports his theory on the
>assumption his theory is true. So the well is poisoned via question begging.
>
>Cheers, Ken Hanly