>Yes, but the whole problem we've been bouncing around is criteriology
>of acceptance and the ? of whether H's models get us past the
>refinements of skepticism in a multitude of every day contexts,
>economic, legal, philosophical and otherwise. It's the damn *not*
>operator in language/logic/explanatory/justificatory practices. Pilate
>1, Habermas 1/3......heading into the 6th inning......
>
>Ian
I think this was mentioned in a blur of increasing complexity... the skeptic can take up an antagonistic position with regards to all communicative norms, in theory but not in practice. If the skeptic wishes to refute any specific norms, they must enter into the conversation, whereby the end up make the same assumptions as everyone else. There are formal criteria for this thing we call "argumentation." An argument is only an argument if.... this is the moral core of a moral theory of discourse. It is simply a logical requirement and not a moral principle in itself. The normative core of a discourse ethics is that, in principle, any norm that participants agree to is binding. Habermas formulates this along the lines of the principle of universalizability (U) and the principle of discourse (D).
To put a Durkheimian spin on this, understanding in the 'glue' of human interactivity, without it, the world becomes hopelessly fragmented from the viewpoint of a participant. The skeptic can take up an antogonistic perspective, but cannot, ultimately, reject understanding as normative without defeating their own skeptical perspective.
ken