On Mon, 30 Jul 2001, Kenneth MacKendrick wrote:
> I think this was mentioned in a blur of increasing complexity... the
> skeptic can take up an antagonistic position with regards to all
> communicative norms, in theory but not in practice. If the skeptic wishes
> to refute any specific norms, they must enter into the conversation,
> whereby the end up make the same assumptions as everyone else. There are
> formal criteria for this thing we call "argumentation." An argument is only
> an argument if.... this is the moral core of a moral theory of discourse.
> It is simply a logical requirement and not a moral principle in itself. The
> normative core of a discourse ethics is that, in principle, any norm that
> participants agree to is binding. Habermas formulates this along the lines
> of the principle of universalizability (U) and the principle of discourse (D).
>
Why this talk of "logical requirements" and general principles? Isn't it possible that the criteria for an argument are locally created and sustained by actual life in a specific society? An argument is only an argument--if it meets the criteria for being called an argument according to local social standards. I guess this is what bugs me here: why assume there must be some logical, universalized, formal criteria for argumentation? Any "norms" we have about communication reflect the importance of local and contingent standards we have for talking-- language games, if you will--and not simply some general philosophical principles.
H. reminds me of a theologian arguing for the existence of God-- everywhere, everywhere evidence of God's work! Consider the underlying order of the human eye--this could only be explained by intelligent design!
Okay, I'm getting frivolous, but what are the useful advantages of H's rational reconstruction of communicative action? Why not actually study the myriad ways in which people communicate? Why shoehorn the delicious complexity of language use by trying to extricate general principles from human diversity?
Miles