>Why this talk of "logical requirements" and general principles? Isn't it
>possible that the criteria for an argument are locally created and
>sustained by actual life in a specific society?
Like in Utah an argument is a rational discussion between two or more people, but in Manitoba they fling moose heads at one another? I don't buy it.
It is worth keeping in mind that for Habermas an argument is a science, or at least it is analogous to science. It isn't an 'exact' science, but it follows the procedures and processes of informal logic. When we're talking about figuring out how to build air plane landing gear, we don't want to skip the details. When we're talking about the justification of moral norms, why be any less concerned with the finer points?
> An argument is only an
>argument--if it meets the criteria for being called an argument according
>to local social standards. I guess this is what bugs me here: why assume
>there must be some logical, universalized, formal criteria for
>argumentation?
Yes and no. There is a strong version and a weak version. In the strong version, which is Habermas's, we can spell these criteria out in a universalist way. In the weak version, Wellmer's version, which I think is also close to Benhabib's communicative ethics, we simply proceed on the basis of weeding out 'bad' argumentative forms. So the procedure don't need a 'strong' idealization in the Habermasian sense, but is rooted in local traditions and customs - informed by theoretical insight - but adapted in relation to the structures one finds meaningful / significant. One might look at issues concerning religion and religious institutions and consensus-building... the 'logic' would stay relatively the same, but the details leave a lot of room... In the weak version, argumentative practice takes on a 'negating' function, a kind of critical-memory about unfair, unjust, or exclusionary measures.... and working to eliminate them as they come up - without pushing head strong into some sort of rigid formatism.
> Any "norms" we have about communication reflect the
>importance of local and contingent standards we have for talking--
>language games, if you will--and not simply some general philosophical
>principles.
>
>H. reminds me of a theologian arguing for the existence of God--
>everywhere, everywhere evidence of God's work! Consider the underlying
>order of the human eye--this could only be explained by
>intelligent design!
Well, Habermas does claim that what Hegel calls spirit we know call
communication.
: )
>Okay, I'm getting frivolous, but what are the useful advantages
>of H's rational reconstruction of communicative action? Why not
>actually study the myriad ways in which people communicate?
He does, but he does so on an abstract level (ie. indirectly). He takes the arguments developed in sociology, anthropology, ethnography, social psychology, cognitive development,systems theory and so on - and pulls them all together, reintegrating them through a communicative action model...
> Why
>shoehorn the delicious complexity of language use by trying to
>extricate general principles from human diversity?
>
>Miles
I have a conceptual motive and a fundamental intuition.... The motivating thought concerns the reconciliation of a modernity which has fallen apart... The intuition springs from the sphere of relations with others; it aims at experience of undisturbed intersubjectivity. - JH
We can learn something about Habermas by looking at his 'arch-enemies.'
Arnold Gehlen Martin Heidegger Carl Schmitt Ernst Junger
Derrida and Foucault are just fooling around. Habermas doesn't like it and thinks it conservative, but his real worry is a return to slaughter, anti-humanism, and destruction. He sees kernels of this in each and every vindication of irrational thought, and he defends a theory of rationality - which if even the smallest pinprick were to be taken seriously - would make the devastation which has become common, unthinkable.