>Ah yes, there's good reason--that's the kind JH espouses--and bad,
>"instrumental" reason.
Augh, no no no no no no no... instrumental reason isn't bad. It just inadequately describes what people are doing when they are doing things. Instrumental reason is 'bad' when it destroys its own basis, ie. its communicative base (which usually entails the snapping of bones I mentioned in a post a couple minutes ago).
>Why make this abstract distinction? Isn't it
>possible that reason and rationality can be used to different ends?
Reason and rationality. And you just asked me why I was making abstract distinctions.
Habermas outlines several kinds of rationality (reasoning).
purposive - goal oriented instrumental - used to accomplish technical tasks strategic - when a group of people collaborate to enact an instrumental task communicative - pertaining to understanding
and so on...
>And that it is not some abstract "type" of rationality that is
>beneficial but rather how that rationality is woven into a form of life?
Yes, exactly. How that rationality is woven into a form of life. That's why we need a theory of rationality, which is: a theory of communicative action.
>I mean, instrumental reason is used in public libraries to facilitate
>the cooperative use of media throughout the U. S. and the world.
>According to my moral view, this is a perfectly appropriate
>application of rationality. We don't need any "differentiated"
>understanding of reason here; we need to study how rationality is
>actually applied, for good or bad, in actual social contexts.
Yes, yes yes... this is exactly what Habermas is doing. People study behaviour in social contexts. Habermas then draws on their research and theorizes it and makes distinctions that, for the most part, the individual and fragmented studies were not able to make because of their contextualization. Habermas is, in effect, supplementing empirical studies with a theoretical analysis. It stands to be discredited, he is open about this. It can't be discredited without reasons supplying evidence against the arguments for it...
>Perhaps this is just the philosopher and the social scientist talking
>past each other.
We seem to agree on most points...
ken