On Tue, 31 Jul 2001, Kenneth MacKendrick wrote:
> The problem is this: if instrumental reason is 'the whole' - then criticism
> cannot exist, because if instrumental reason is equated with domination,
> then there can be no assurance that the critique is not one more piece of
> domination manifesting itself. In other words, criticism becomes groundless.
>
> Habermas escapes this aporia by pointing to a more differentiated
> understanding of reason, which is completely irreducible to instrumental
> reason.
>
> ken
>
Ah yes, there's good reason--that's the kind JH espouses--and bad, "instrumental" reason. Why make this abstract distinction? Isn't it possible that reason and rationality can be used to different ends? And that it is not some abstract "type" of rationality that is beneficial but rather how that rationality is woven into a form of life? I mean, instrumental reason is used in public libraries to facilitate the cooperative use of media throughout the U. S. and the world. According to my moral view, this is a perfectly appropriate application of rationality. We don't need any "differentiated" understanding of reason here; we need to study how rationality is actually applied, for good or bad, in actual social contexts.
Perhaps this is just the philosopher and the social scientist talking past each other.
Miles