>From: Brad Mayer <bradley.mayer at ebay.sun.com>
>Reply-To: lbo-talk at lists.panix.com
>To: lbo-talk at lists.panix.com
>Subject: RE: Balancing the Japanese economy down
>Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2001 14:37:31 -0800
>
>Stratfor had a very relevant freebee on Japan today. It zeros in on why I
>am currently interested in Japan, from an opposing class perspective, of
>course. Japan is the Sick Dog of Empire right now - the weak link at the
>top of the hierarchy, occupying the place held by Britain in the 60's and
>70's, before Thatcher. This was so not because of economics - Britain is
>still economically sick - but because of politics, because the Japanese has
>yet to suffer the sharp defeat administered to the British working class
>which opened up the reactionary period we have been living through.
>
>We should all be paying more attention to this country - especially from a
>_class perspective_, as Stratfor does. Japan (and China, but _right now_
>Japan has a special geopolitical significance) may be the site of the next
>wave of great class battles in our time. The results of these battles may
>determine if we, at long last, pull out of the reaction, or if we are to be
>condemned to further decades of blight.
>
>Annotated excerpts below, to filter out the inevitable Anglo-American
>imperial BS:
>
>>Mori’s Political Woes Pale Next to
>> Japan’s Systematic Trouble
>> 09 March 2001
>> By George Friedman
>>.....
>>The very policies that allowed Japan to triumph in the 1980s created the
>>deep malaise of the 1990s. During this period, the primary concern of
>>successive Japanese governments was to maintain social stability. Compare
>>this with the United States’ liquidity crisis of the late 1970s. The
>>response was high interest rates, high unemployment and a ruthless
>>restructuring of American industry during the early to mid-1980s. This
>>laid the groundwork for the boom of the 1990s. Where the United States had
>>the social resiliency to endure the restructuring of the 1980s,
>>Japan’s political elite are much more wary about their ability to impose
>>pain on the Japanese public.
>
>"social resiliency", my ass. Call it imperial prerogative - the ability to
>export your problems to the rest of the world, to countries like - Japan.
>That process was launched by the Plaza Accords (1986), and was accelerated
>by the counterrevolution of 1989-91, carried out by the privileged middle
>strata of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. This
>counterrevolution put immense pressure on the reforms won by workers all
>over the world.
>
>This situation, coupled to the historical weakness of the Japanese
>bourgeoisie, produced the stalemate - the unwillingness to frontally
>assault the Japanese working class in the Thatcher/Reagan style.
>
>> .....
>> Two forces are at work. The first is rooted in the Japanese cultural
>>ethic of social solidarity. Japan is the only industrialized country that
>>has never experienced a
>>social revolution. Feudal loyalties run both ways; in return for loyalty
>>to the leadership, the elite must protect the interests of the lower
>>classes. The Japanese
>> government has simply decided it cannot follow the standard Western
>>response to a liquidity crisis by slashing consumption – particularly
>>among working and middle
>> class families – through high interest rates and unemployment.
>
>"Japan is the only industrialized country that has never experienced a
>social revolution". Stratfor means _from below_. "Ee ja nai ka" was
>cultural (and therefore social) but not political, AMPO was political but
>not social. Also, add in the criteria of success: Germany has experienced
>more than one social revolution from below, none successful. But stating
>it this way allows you to indulge in cultural bigotries such as talk about
>"Feudal loyalties". Which are presumed not to exist in places such as
>Britain, or the USA. But this is not the reason for the unwillingness to
>attack.
>
>>The second force impacting the situation deals with the nature of the
>>Japanese political elite. While Japan is a democracy, working behind that
>>democratic system
>> is another system of entrenched bureaucratic elites in the various
>>ministries with close ties to Japan’s corporate structure. This stratum
>>has enormous practical power and a vested interest in stability and in
>>maintaining its relative position. Senior officials view the economic
>>problems through a lens of personal and institutional
>>interests. Bold initiatives radically reshaping Japanese society will not
>>emerge from this sector.
>
>No country is a "democracy", of course. Statfor's right about the
>relatively greater weight of the bureaucracy - it's another measure of the
>historical-structural weakness of the Japanese bourgeoisie. It's a feature
>that allows the ideological maniacs who control the Anglo-American media to
>babble on about "socialism", etc. But their ideology may blind them to the
>possibility that this layer, rather than the "traditional" bourgeoisie,
>could take the lead against the Japanese working class. "Bold initiatives"
>could well "emerge from this sector." This would conform to the most
>salient feature of our reactionary times - its bureaucratically-driven
>character. 1989-1991 was probably its defining moment, its apogee. This
>is a clue for its reversal - get hip to it!
>
>> So, Japanese prime ministers have come and gone throughout the 1990s.
>>Each on the whole ineffectual, but able to hold together the basic social
>>contract with the
>>collaboration of the ministries and corporations. Japan bought into the
>>stability of stagnation, a shared experience of distributed misery.
>
>"Misery", my ass. Actually, this has been one of the most goldplated
>stagnation-crises in modern history - in sharp contrast to Britain of the
>1960s-70s. Again, the Anglo-American lunatics can't imagine a world
>without profits as anything other as misery.
>>..........................................
>>Japan faces an economic crisis that could rapidly give way to a social
>>crisis. The unemployment figures cut to the heart of Japan’s social
>>contract. Unlike stagnation,
>>unemployment is not a shared experience but something that hits the
>>population disproportionately. Japan’s reserves of economic strength are
>>cracking.
>
>"unemployment is not a shared experience but something that hits the
>population disproportionately", very true, as is "Japan faces an economic
>crisis that could rapidly give way to a social crisis.". But it doesn't
>follow that "Japan’s reserves of economic strength are cracking." In fact,
>exercising its own, albeit much more limited imperial perogative, Japan has
>been "exporting the crisis" (i.e., investment and loan capital) to the rest
>of East Asia, in particular, China, an ungaugeable wild card in this
>situation. This is the objective basis which politically links the Japanese
>process with that of China.
>
>>As Mori topples, there is a striking lack of personalities to replace him.
>>The obvious choices are as much placeholders as he. There is a deep
>>hollowness in the
>>Japanese political system. The mystery of Mori’s survival is that while he
>>has no support, no one else seems any better.
>
>Japan is not unique in this regard. In fact, there is a general lack of
>strong-willed, class-oriented "offensive leadership" for the capitalist
>classes of the imperialist world. Britain: Instead of Thatcher, Tony Boy
>and some half-lunatic Tories. The USA: The Shrub instead of Reagan.
>Germany? - it's unclear who runs that country these days. And so forth.
>
>>.........................................................
>>
>>There is precedent for this in Japan. During the 1920s, after a remarkably
>>similar economic crisis, Japan executed a fairly sudden – and in many ways
>>unexpected – shift from a sort of liberalism toward militarism and
>>xenophobia. Indeed, what is remarkable in Japanese history is the
>>suddenness of its social shifts. Japan was a
>>pre-industrial society in 1860. Less than a half century later, it
>>defeated Russia in war. Japan was a violently aggressive culture until
>>1945 then genuinely shifted toward pacifist liberalism.
>
>More cultural bigotry: "a violently aggressive culture" - what else from a
>warrior class that ruled for centuries? It became its opposite, though,
>both for 250 years of the Edo period (under the same warrior class), and
>post-WW2. But yes, agreed, countries in awkward geopolitical historical
>situations, such as Russia or Japan, are prone to sudden "social shifts".
>
>>We strongly suspect the answer is not much longer. The internal situation
>>in Japan has become intolerable and unsustainable. History will neither
>>note nor care about
>>Mori. What is important about him and the current situation is that it
>>drives home the fact that Japan is running out of maneuver room with this
>>political and economic system. The poll numbers indicate Japan is facing
>>systemic failure.
>>What comes next? As with Russia, we expect sudden, unexpected change that
>>will take Japan in radical new directions.
>
>Despite its own misconceptions, Stratfor is on to something, alright. It
>is mostly "intolerable" for the worlds' capitalists, as we've seen no
>large-scale actions (defensive or otherwise) from the Japanese working
>class (contrast with Korea). _They_ appear "content", that's a warning
>sign for _us_. Whether Japan is "running out of maneuver room" is still
>unknown, but it is clear that the Washington-London axis is applying the
>squeeze to it.
>
>Critical missing info: organization of working class in Japan.
>
>Japanese workers, "wise up"! ;-) You're about to get whacked!
>
>-Brad Mayer
>Oakland, CA
>
>>Date: Sun, 11 Mar 2001 12:51:07 -0800
>>From: "Bob Morris" <bobmorris at mediaone.net>
>>Subject: RE: Balancing the Japanese economy down
>>
>>< sell the yen>
>>
>> >stratfor.com has been sourced on this list before.
>>This would
>>create a worse market for U.S. exports, thereby
>>creating a
>>countervailing - perhaps not equal - force to the Fed's
>>rate
>>lowerings. If folks do sell their Yen, what would they
>>buy?
>>
>>The StratFor article indicated that the "sell the yen"
>>call was a desperation move, a short-term play, and
>>probably doomed to failure. They see Japan's prospects
>>as bleak, at best, with a dysfunctional economy having
>>major effects on the inherent social contract. "Feudal
>>loyalties run both ways; in return for loyalty to the
>>leadership, the elite must protect the interests of the
>>lower classes", and with unacceptable, by Japanese
>>standards, levels of unemployment, things are starting
>>to crack.
>
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