>
>Isn't the problem with your [Justin's] non-relativism due precisely to
>the surplus meanings of congressional intent[s]? Doesn't this preclude
>holding steadfast to a non-relativist take on adjudication? It seems
>judges run into Wittgenstein's claims on rule following, no?
>
>Ian
>
That is in part why I am pretty much of a textualist in statutory interpretation, aside from the small fact that the text of the statute is the law we interpret. The text is the best guide to legislative intent. Often statutes are hard to read and apply. But if you do the work, in most cases you get a determinate, right answer. This is what I do all day. It's hard and interesting, but it's hard and interesting because there is a right answer to figure out, not because there is so much indeterminacy that I can make any issue come out any way I want.
Btw, with regard to Leo's remarks about interpreting the big constitutional clauses, there is more indeterminacy there, though the case law narrows it down a lot. But even though a lot of theorists find con law more sexy, it's really a very small area of the law. Statutory anf administrative law is what the courts mostly deal with.
--jks _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com