>Isn't the problem with your [Justin's] non-relativism due precisely to
>the surplus meanings of congressional intent[s]? Doesn't this preclude
>holding steadfast to a non-relativist take on adjudication? It seems
>judges run into Wittgenstein's claims on rule following, no?
>
>Ian
>
That is in part why I am pretty much of a textualist in statutory
interpretation, aside from the small fact that the text of the statute is
the law we interpret. The text is the best guide to legislative intent.
Often statutes are hard to read and apply. But if you do the work, in most
cases you get a determinate, right answer. This is what I do all day. It's
hard and interesting, but it's hard and interesting because there is a right
answer to figure out, not because there is so much indeterminacy that I can
make any issue come out any way I want.
--jks
============= I agree with what your saying here to a very large extent; but the indeterminacy that comes into play that I think many are concerned and angry about is precisely whether/when legislatures "overstep" their "authority" in criminalizing previously non-criminous behaviour at the behest of moral zealots and if this is where the 9th amendment seems to serve to put a break on that; yet the courts are in a pickle on whether to demur or resist congressional intent when the C as a textual "dang in sich" offers no help on the issue. Its' the whole procedural/substantive issue with a vengeance and their sorites-like malleability.
Ian