Justin Schwartz wrote:
> In my arrogance, I trust my own judgment about which cases are slam dunk; I
> normally think I am right, like everyone else, although I have been
> persuaded otherwise in granted motions to reconsider and the like. But I
> think I know the diffeence between cases where I think I am right, but
> reasonable lawyers might reasonably differ, and the vast majority of cases
> where I think there is no reasonable difference on legal questions.
> (Questions of fact are another story.) John, why will I learn to disguise
> this? What's wrong with it?
Why? When: 1. As an appellate advocate you are looking up at a member of the panel who has just asked you how an opinion (which you "know" to be both stupid and wrong but you suddenly recall she just happened to write) affects the issues in your case; 2. As an associate when a partner calls you into her office and tells you to draft a complaint on a theory recently permitted in an opinion you "know" to be both stupid and wrong; 3. As trial counsel when your opponents' key piece of evidence can be excluded on a precedent you "know" to be both stupid and wrong; 4. After an embittered client has gone to a new attorney who is filing an ineffective assistance claim alleging that you failed to advance a theory that would have decided the case favorably, your partner is asking you what happened while glancing at a copy of your malpractice insurance, and while you happen to "know" the decision that advanced that theory is both stupid and wrong, you also happen to have just about any other excuse in the world available including that the dog ate your homework.
john mage