It seems to me that usually -- almost always -- when psychological labels are invoked in political or historical analysis we have an instance of the kind of error Marx described in _Poverty of Philosophy_ in analyzing "providence." The need i to distinguish explanations which in fact only name what is to be explained and explanations that do explain historically. ----------
Thus *Providence* is the locomotive which makes the whole of M. Proudhon's economic baggage move better than his pure and volatilised reason. He has devoted to Providence a whole chapter, which follows the one on taxes.
Providence, providential aim, this is the great word used today to explain the movement of history. In fact, this word explains nothing. It is at most a rhetorical form, one of the various ways of paraphrasing facts.
It is a fact that in Scotland landed property acquired a new value by the development of English industry. This industry opened up new outlets for wool. In order to produce wool on a large scale, arable land had to be transformed into pasturage. To effect this transformation, the estates had to be concentrated. To concentrate the estates, small holdings had first to be abolished, thousands of tenants had to be driven from their native soil and a few shepherds in charge of millions of sheep to be installed in their place. Thus, by successive transformations, landed property in Scotland has resulted in the driving out of men by sheep. Now say that the providential aim of the institution of landed property in Scotland was to have men driven out by sheep, and you will have made providential history.
Of course, the tendency towards equality belongs to our century. To say now that all former centuries, with entirely different needs, means of production, etc., worked providentially for the realisation of equality is, firstly, to substitute the means and the men of our century for the men and the means of earlier centuries and to misunderstand the historical movement by which the successive generations transformed the results acquired by the generations that preceded them. Economists know very well that the very thing that was for the one a finished product was for the other but the raw material for new production.
Suppose, as M. Proudhon does, tht social genius produced, or rather improvised, the feudal lords with the providential aim of transforming the *settlers* into *responsible* and *equally-placed* workers: and you will have effected a substitution of aims and of persons worthy of the Providence that instituted landed property in Scotland, in order to give itself the malicious pleasure of driving out men by sheep.
But since M. Proudhon takes such a tender interest in Providence, we refer him to the *Histoire de l'economie politique* of M. de Villenneuve-Bargemont, who likewise goes in pursuit of a providential aim. This aim, however, is not equality, but catholicism.
*Pov. Phil* (Moscow, 1973), pp. 104-105
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One may _always_ give such a pseudo-explanation of human activity merely by coining a general enough label. The work on "eurocentrism" of the late Jim Blaut was essentially an exercise in Proudhonian history -- that is in replacing historical analysis with a moralistic label. A good deal of left kookery flows from a similar paraphrase of the facts, "authority," masquerading as an explanation of the facts it paraphrases.
Christopher Rhoades Dÿkema wrote:
>
> [clip]
>
> Chip Berlet wrote:
>
> There are several authoritarian personality types, including leaders (S)
>
> > and followers (M) and they can be found in religious and secular belief
> > systems, and span left to right.
>
> Actually, leaders are both S and M. So are followers.
We have an authoritarian political structure, which of course will include "leaders" and "followers." We replace those simple labels with more pretentions ones, "sadistic personalities" and "masochistic personalities," and we have successfully blocked off any further attempt at explaining.
> There also is the
> phenomenon of authoritarian rebellion, which helps us understand many
> historical forms democratic struggle that were formally leftist, at least
> insofar as they opposed aristocracies and bourgeoisies in various places. I
> recently reread Brenan's THE SPANISH LABYRINTH, and found the
> anarcho-syndicalists a probable example.
There are political reasons that anarcho-syndicalism should both appear
within certain capitalist conjunctions and why it should frequently
(when it does not merely evaporate) transform itself into some rightist
form of authoritarianism. But we need not consider those conditions for
that need is precluded by the convenient label of "authoritarian
personality."
>
> >
> >
> > I don't misunderstand--I disagree. I am not disputing the model, I am
> > disputing its application to Christianity in a simplistic, didactic, and
> > exceptionalist way.
>
> Christianity has not always been authoritarian. But it has always been a
> manifestation of sado-masochistic character structure.
This is tautological, for "Christianity" has been _defined_ as "sado-masochistic." Hence the label discourages attempts to explain under which historical conditions this sado-masochistic tendency manifests itself and under which it does not. Presumably the tendency would always be there, whether manifested or not. Hence to offer it as an explanation of Christian support of rightist politics is useless, because one still must resort to history to explain when the tendency appears.
Carrol