COMMENT & ANALYSIS: The war of words
Financial Times, Nov 1, 2001
By LAWRENCE FREEDMAN
The propaganda war is now claimed to be central to the outcome of the current confrontation. No matter how effective the US is in its air strikes and ground operations, it risks losing the battle for hearts and minds. For the Americans this is puzzling. They consider themselves self-evidently the aggrieved party, yet find themselves on the defensive. They cannot understand how a nation that invented public relations and dominates the world media can get caught by a group that communicates only via melodramatic statements dispatched from a country that bans television.
>From the start, al-Qaeda's offensive was framed in terms of a propaganda
war - but not in the western sense of a media blitz. If there is a model
it is the old anarchist notion of the "propaganda of the deed". This
notion justified acts of terrorism - usually assassinations - as a means
of undermining the old order by illustrating that those who claimed to be
all- powerful were in fact vulnerable. Dramatic deeds would cause the
ruling classes to lash out; but each punitive action would open the eyes
of the masses and feed their clamour for an end to oppression.
In global terms this is the war that Osama bin Laden is now fighting. Al- Qaeda cannot beat the US and its allies in direct battle. If it is to achieve its objectives it must take the initiative, if possible by mounting more attacks to add to the American sense of vulnerability, while setting the terms for the war by claiming that it is between infidel crusaders and Islam. It has a well prepared audience for such a message in countries where the local media regularly denounce western policies.
If its counter-offensive is to succeed the US must puncture the aura surrounding Mr bin Laden and his associates and disrupt their operations to the point where they cannot carry out further attacks. Until then, it will remain on the propaganda defensive, insisting that its campaign is directed against neither the Islamic world in general nor the Afghan people in particular, that its military strikes are carefully targeted and that it is not only prepared for a long haul but also has a durable strategy.
So far, the informed consensus appears to be that this war is being lost. The spectacle of the strongest nation in the world beating up one of the most wretched is uncomfortable, as is the continuing association with Israeli policies. If Muslims in London are sceptical, what must they think in Quetta, Gaza and Jakarta? In the noisy streets that now constitute the Islamic front line, America and Britain are hated more than ever. Whatever the previous disclaimers, the fact that Mr bin Laden has still not been found and that the Taliban appears unmoved by the firepower directed at it adds to the doubt. Every misgiving voiced by a supposedly friendly government soon becomes cited as evidence that the coalition that boasted such solidarity is now riven by internal tensions and risks falling apart.
Yet the material consequences of setbacks in the propaganda war are hard to find. As anarchists discovered, "propaganda of the deed" could take a radical cause only so far before it became lost in the backlash.
No matter how many bombs go astray, American public opinion is not going to waver. Other governments will change their foreign policies when they recalculate their national interests - not because of mood swings. They can urge restraint but they are not going to disrupt their relations with the US because things appear to be going not quite to plan.
The regimes in the Muslim world where al-Qaeda's message has the greatest appeal fully understand its logic and the dire implications for their rule. They are not known for bending to the popular will.
Western countries need to ask why they are hated but they should not always draw the conclusion that it is because they are wrong. The risk is different. Studies of past wars suggest that domestic and international opinion does not falter because of casualties on either side so much as because of a sense that the government has lost the initiative and become internally divided and uncertain, that sacrifices are being made to no purpose, that the whole exercise is futile. This is why support for Vietnam collapsed in the US and why the alliance faced difficulties at a similar moment in the Kosovo campaign, when the bombing had been under way for weeks, causing pain in Serbia but no political movement. It also explains why, despite the difficulties, support held firm during the Falklands and Gulf wars.
The coalition campaign is not yet in real difficulties but it is possible to see that this could change, especially if the impression takes hold that the bombing continues only because Washington cannot think of anything better to do.
The requirement for the propaganda war is not that different from the real war: a credible strategy that can take the initiative away from the Taliban/al-Qaeda, with some tangible evidence of progress.
The writer is professor of war studies at King's College London
Copyright: The Financial Times Limited