(...)
No need for clarivoyancy; the US goals are on public record. The strategic
importance of Central Asia was one of the main themes of Brzezinski’s Grand
Chessboard, where he argued that the US must ensure that no rival powers
such as Iran, Russia, India, or China should be allowed to gain military,
political, or economic dominance. These general principles were restated in
much more specific terms at the House Subcommittee Hearing On US Interests
In The Central Asian Republics in 1998 (the famous UNOCAL hearing)[1]:
“Today the Subcommittee examines the interests of a new contestant in this new great game, the United States. The five countries which make up Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, attained their independence in 1991, and have once again captured worldwide attention due to the phenomenal reserves of oil and natural gas located in the region. In their desire for political stability as well as economic independence and prosperity, these nations are anxious to establish relations with the United States.
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan possess large reserves of oil and natural gas, both on-shore and off-shore in the Caspian Sea, which they urgently seek to exploit. Uzbekistan has oil and gas reserves that may permit it to be self- sufficient in energy and gain revenue through exports. Estimates of Central Asian oil reserves vary widely, but are usually said to rival those of the North Sea or Alaska. More accurate estimates of oil and gas resources await wider exploration and the drilling of test wells.
Stated U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in this region include fostering the independence of the States and their ties to the West; breaking Russia's monopoly over oil and gas transport routes; promoting Western energy security through diversified suppliers; encouraging the construction of east-west pipelines that do not transit Iran; and denying Iran dangerous leverage over the Central Asian economies.
(...)
Central Asia would seem to offer significant new investment opportunities for a broad range of American companies which, in turn, will serve as a valuable stimulus to the economic development of the region. Japan, Turkey, Iran, Western Europe, and China are all pursuing economic development opportunities and challenging Russian dominance in the region. It is essential that U.S. policymakers understand the stakes involved in Central Asia as we seek to craft a policy that serves the interests of the United States and U.S. business.”
This is in fact very similar to US policy in the Gulf region, where client states host a US-UK military presence deterring regional and strategic rivals, while providing a huge market for US-UK arms exports (Saudi Arabia is the world’s biggest arms importer – it placed orders in the US worth $25 billion between 1990-92)[2]. These client states have historically pursued a pricing and supply policy in the US’s favor[3]. Oil-producing US clients also provide petrodollar investments that help offset the chronic US budget- and current accounts deficits. Lastly, these client states ensure that the price of oil remains dollar-denominated, giving the US economy a permanent advantage over its rivals. I'm not even counting preferential treatment for the US in civilian government contracts.
|| Oil: This seems to be the favorite. It could be, but it also is hard to
|| believe either (a) that such a fantastic enterprise as this war could be
|| carried out for the advantage of one small sector of u.s. capitalists
|| (it can't help more than one or two oil companies) or (b) that it is
|| really necessary for the u.s. to have military control over the sources
|| of its oil when all it needs is the money to buy it.
||
As you can see from the above, a wide range of economic interests are served by US hegemony over oil production and distribution. This hegemony obviously can’t be bought: Saudi Aramco shares are not for sale, nor are military bases. If US arms sales were to proceed in a competitive environment, the US would get only a fraction of the contracts it has obtained. If OPEC were left free to determine the price of oil, SUV’s would never have seen the day. These and other advantages mentioned above are obtained through something taught at a number of US colleges: Oil diplomacy. War is, of course, a form of diplomacy.
Now let’s see oil-war-diplomacy at play:
The US and UK supported Saddam in his war against Iran as a way of weakening and containing a former US client state which had turned into a rival. When the war ended, Iran’s military had been whittled down and Iraq was economically bankrupt. Western assistance to Iraq had ceased and the Gulf states, also cutting off their assistance, kept oil prices low, thus further damaging Iraq’s economy. In addition to this, Kuwait was provocatively siphoning oil from Iraq’s oil fields, and no amount of threats from Iraq could budge the Gulf states, which had suddenly become uncharacteristically brave. It was in this environment that the US suckered Iraq into invading Kuwait:
“The U.S. government used the Kuwaiti royal family to provoke an Iraqi invasion that would justify a massive assault on Iraq to establish U.S. dominion in the Gulf. The Gulf War was fought not to restore Kuwait's sovereignty, as President Bush proclaimed, but to establish U.S. power over the region and its oil.
As Jordan's King Hussein accurately stated in a letter to Saddam Hussein in September 1990:
"The large industrial powers see in the Gulf crisis a golden opportunity to reorganize the area according to designs in harmony with their ambitions and interests, at the expense of the aspirations and the interests of the Arab peoples, and to put in place a new international order.’
The Pentagon has acknowledged this evaluation. A revealing draft of its plan to prevent the emergence of rival powers in the world, reported by the New York Times on March 8, 1992, contained the following paragraph about the Gulf War.
‘In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region's oil.... As demonstrated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it remains fundamentally important to prevent a hegemon or alignment of powers from dominating the region.’”[4]
The Gulf war locked the Gulf states – principally Saudi Arabia – into the US post-cold-war policy of “dual containment” where Iran and Iraq replaced the USSR as the primary threat to the region, and the US became more necessary than ever for the Gulf’s “protection”.
That was Oil War I by George Bush Sr.. For Oil War II by George Bush Jr., substitute:
1. the Central Asian dictatorships for the Gulf dictatorships
2. the Taliban, Al Qaeda & related Wahhabite guerillas for Iraq.
Additionally, factor in a brand-new market, China, waiting to be plugged into a US-controlled energy pipeline.
|| Sheer blundering incompetence: 'they' really don't know what they're
|| doing or why. This tends to be my favorite.
(...)
I agree, but for different reasons. The grandiose Great Game does not take into account the resilience of the Afghans and their steadfast resistance to foreign interference. The US with all its military might has thus far not succeded in being much more than an accessory to the NA and a spectator to the Taliban’s orderly redeployment.
Hakki
[1] http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa48119.000/hfa48119_0f.htm
[2]F. Gregory Gause III: Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf, http://\www.arts.mcgill.ca/programs/icas/gause/chapter5.html
[3] In the 10 years following the formation of OPEC, the price of oil remained flat, and decreased in real terms. It was only due to the 1973 Yom Kippur war that the price quadrupled, but then began to fall once again in the ‘80’s. The efforts of Iran and Iraq to increase oil prices have been opposed by US-UK client Gulf states.
[4] Ramsey Clarke:The Fire This Time, Thunder's Mouth Press ,1992, http://www.pcug.co.uk/~whip/usa/usd.htm