"Is Bush's War Our War?"

[Mark Pavlick]

>Status:  U
>Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 15:16:26 -0600 (CST)
>From: "David C. Schweickart" <dschwei at orion.it.luc.edu>
>
>Christopher Hitchens spoke at the University of Chicago on Tuesday.  I've
>been thinking about his talk ever since.  Hitchens seems not to be a very
>nice person.  He was boorish during the question period, derisive to the
>anti-war folks and especially to the poor Socialist Workers students, who
>had, in fact, some good questions to ask.  I found his behavior repellent.
>Still, much of what he said during his talk was arresting, and, I think,
>has to be taken seriously.  Let me lay out his position (more carefully
>than he laid it out), and see what you think.
>
>Hitchens' main point was that the Taliban should be seen as a fascist
>organization with transnational designs that is truly dangerous and needed
>to be stopped.  Neither the Clinton nor Bush administrations had any real
>interest in confronting the Taliban--any more than the United States or
>Britain had any real interest in reigning in Mussolini or Hitler, since,
>in both cases the movements were resolutely anti-communist.  But, says
>Hitchens, "Osama bin Laden saved us."  His grandstanding attack on the
>U.S. provoked a war, much as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor forced
>the U.S. hand.  In both cases, without really wanting to, the U.S. has
>been compelled to wage war against fascism.  Hitchens' conclusion: "Bush's
>war is our war."  ("Our" meaning the Left's.)
>
>The argument that the Taliban is fascist:   (This argument applies not
>just to the Taliban, but to various other versions of virulent Islamic
>fundamentalism.)
>
>1) Its horrendously retrograde treatment of women.  Nazism, too, preyed on
>masculine gender insecurity by invoking a hyper-masculine ideology,
>emphasizing purity, cruelty, military valor, etc.
>
>2) Its peculiar nature as a modern mass movement energized by an atavistic
>ideology.   The Nazi ideology of racial purity--though hardly foreign to
>Western culture--was retrograde by then current Western standards, just as
>the Islamic fundamentalist ideology--while hardly foreign to Western
>culture--is retrograde by our current standards.  In both cases, the
>movements appeal to prejudices that flourish under conditions of extreme
>social and economic insecurity, and hence gain a mass following.
>
>3) It has been funded by the wealthy as a mass movement capable of
>destroying the progressive Left elements.  Hitchens argues that Saudi
>Arabia (which, incidentally, is refusing to cooperate with the
>investigation of the Sept 11 hijackers, most of whom were Saudis) has
>poured money into radical fundamentalist organizations and schools around
>the world--including Palestinian organizations, where it has done
>poisonous damage.   The U.S. has been ambivalent.  The first great
>outpouring of Islamic fundamentalism was the Iranian Revolution, which
>hated the U.S.  On the other hand, the fundamentalists destroyed the Left,
>aided the Reagan Administration's war against the Sandinistas, and--a
>different branch--waged a holy war against the Russians in Afganistan.
>
>4) Like Nazism, Islamic fundamentalism sometimes bites the hand the feeds
>it.  It takes on a life of its own.  Hitler led Germany to destruction,
>against the wishes of his wealthy backers.  Bin Laden now hates the Saudi
>government.
>
>5) Like Nazism, Islamic fundamentalism has an expansionary ideology, but
>no coherent economic policy for dealing with real problems of the people
>over which it rules.  Hitchens claims that the Taliban was seriously
>involved in an effort to infiltrate the Pakistan military and eventually
>take control of that country too--which, incidentally, has nuclear
>weapons.  Islamic fundamentalism sees itself spreading eastward through
>Indonesia and the southern Philippines, southward into north Africa,
>including northern Nigeria and of course westward into other regions of
>the Middle East.  Like European fascism, its ideology is transnational,
>and appeals to those suffering the insecurities of modernity, particularly
>young men of the middle classes.  (It has not gone unobserved that the
>Sept 11 terrorists were not poor.)
>
>6) Like European fascism, Islamic fundamentalism promises law and order,
>and delivers.  However, although initially welcomed by large segments of
>the population, its repressive apparatus generates increasing discontent.
>Hence, the struggle in Iran to roll back the power of the mullahs.  Hence
>the sense of liberation that so many seem to feel in Afganistan, now that
>the Taliban has fled.  (It may well be that the Afganis hated the Taliban
>more than the U.S. bombs.  Certainly many Italians welcomed the allied
>"invaders.")
>
>This, in essence, is Hitchens' argument.  He didn't make all the
>comparisons I've made, but he could have.  I have to say, I find the
>analogy compelling.  (Hitchens, by the way, finds the right-wing Zionism
>so dominant in Israel right now to be fascist also, or at least morally on
>par with Islamic fundamentalism in its desire for a theocratic state.)
>
>What follows?  Here's where things get more complicated.  Hitchens'
>position, at least as articulated on Tuesday, doesn't go much beyond
>"support the war and rejoice in its success."  What he didn't comment on,
>but which seems to me equally important, are the U.S. aims.
>
>Its clear that whatever they are, combating Islamic fascism is not one of
>them.  We are not, after all, declaring war on Saudi Arabia or making
>non-negotiable demands.
>
>In my view, the principle aim of the U.S. state right now is to find an
>enemy to replace "the international Communist conspiracy" so as to justify
>our role as global hegemon--and the massive military budget needed to
>sustain that role.  Policing the world for human rights violations--the
>prior candidate--wasn't doing so well.  Neither was "international
>terrorism" either--until September 11.  Now the latter is back in
>business, with a vengeance.  Policy makers are  looking again at Iraq and
>at North Korea and even (unbelievably) at Cuba.  The easy victory over the
>Taliban may be a good thing--a very good thing--insofar as it breaks the
>momentum and mystique of Islamic fundamentalism, but the other side of
>that coin is the encouragement it gives to our policy-makers to pursue
>their quite different agenda.  (I wish the world weren't so complicated,
>so "dialectical.")
>
>I don't know what to say next.  I welcome comments and critiques
>(insulting or otherwise).
>
>--David Schweickart
>
>    Loyola University Chicago
>    November 30, 2001

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