Note to the "ladder of force left"

Max Sawicky sawicky at bellatlantic.net
Wed Oct 24 20:43:02 PDT 2001


TO: Oh, come on - what are the odds for any given three month or even six month period over the 25 years preceeding the 9/11 attacks that there was a "major terrorist attack" on a western nation? This is a silly wager, but given the current anthrax scare, I'll bet you a string of Maldivan cowries.

mbs: Actually the period in question is roughly next April or so till about 14 mos from now. In other words, once U.S. forces have some time when winter in Afg is over (whenever that is), I would suggest an ensuing eight-month period provides some assurance the use of force 'worked.' Long- standing members of this list know a wager with me should not be taken lightly. As bounty I offer up a case of lagavullin owed to me from a previous wager -- collecting it if you win is your problem. It's in the UK. I'll take the string of cowries; given the risk discount of my ever getting the hooch, it seems like an equivalent prize.

TO: If you are serious about treating the intervention as a "historical experiment" - ok, let's do that. But lets get the proper statistical data. I think that what we will find is that terrorist attacks against western targets are sporadic and clustered around precipitating factors, and you have to take a decade as a unit to get meaningful stats. With such a framework, I accept your wager.

mbs: what in the world was precipitating for 9/11? We know attacks are sporadic, but this one would seem to betoken the start of a real offensive. It would be pretty stupid to perpetrate something that outrages a powerful enemy, then just sit on your ass and wait for him to find you. Over what period what a lack of similar events rebut the premise that U.S. force can't work?

TO: Also, as far as a cost benefit analysis goes, we have to be honest and say that 2-4 million starving Afghans is too high a price to pay for, say , an average yearly death toll of about 1000 or even 10,000 Americans every year over the next ten years - assuming Al Qaeda could sustain that, or would want to in the long run, supposing minimal consessions were made. There is a proper moral equivalence between their deaths and ours: they are both completely unnacceptable.

mbs: you're right. it is too high, unless you're one of the 1,000. If you live in Turkey it's too high. Or maybe not, considering that Turkey is probably on the list of countries whose brand of Islam needs some juicing up.

TO: Of course, 2-4 million Afghans haven't starved yet - but that is what our actions are threatening. What bin-Laden's actions are threatening, in the worst, most paranoid right wing scenario, is a nuclear bomb in LA or NY, with maybe a million deaths. But the odds on that are simply unknown; the odds of lots of people dying if we pursue this war further are high. Do certainly terrible actions justify averting uncertain and possibly improbable outcomes?

If I was feeling particularly bold, I'd say the US prefers the cold calculation of using violence, terrible as it is and likely to invoke terrible retribution, than the uncertainty of pursuing the novel course of negotiating and compromising. Elites hate uncertainty. They don't usually gamble unless they can stack the odds, or at least know them.

I make a counter bet: that more Afghans will die as a result of American violence than Americans from Afghan-based violence , over the next few years. I'll bet a Maltese falcon on that. Thiago.

mbs: I don't doubt that a bit. I'd take the same bet.



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