[LA Times] News Analysis Beware the Law of Unintended Consequences
By ROBIN WRIGHT , Times Staff Writer
WASHINGTON -- The outcome of the U.S. war against terrorism may extend far beyond the fate of either Osama bin Laden's vast network or the world's last bastions of extremism. The enduring impact may involve dangers that are barely on the Bush administration's radar screen.
The high-stake risks range from sparking new cycles of anger and hatred that dwarf the current rage against America, to the fate of nations--and longevity of governments--across the Middle East and South Asia.
"We have to be very concerned about unintended consequences, about making more new enemies than we take off the battlefield, and about inflaming the situation in countries like Pakistan where a pro-Western government faces the danger of being replaced by a militant extremist regime," said Rick Inderfurth, former assistant secretary of state for South Asia and now a George Washington University professor.
War always has its unwanted byproducts. But because of this war's unprecedented complexity, the danger of creating new problems that have to be undone later can't be overstated, analysts warn. No Muslim or Arab country that opts to join the U.S.-led coalition is likely to be exempt from some spillover effect.
The threat is illustrated by the onset of bin Laden's campaign against the United States a decade ago.
In the 1980s, the Saudi militant was a de facto U.S. ally during the fight against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. His money funded Arabs trained by Pakistan and often armed, indirectly, with American weapons. His rage against America became visible only after the U.S. deployment in Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, when he charged that the presence of infidel troops in the birthplace of Islam was sacrilegious.
The fate of nuclear-equipped Pakistan, both short- and long-term, is the most worrisome danger. U.S. analysts are already expressing concern about the fate of Pakistani leader Gen. Pervez Musharraf, whose hold on power was precarious even before Washington asked his government to be the key player in nabbing bin Laden.
"There are a lot of people who already believe Musharraf will not survive politically and in a few months will be displaced by others within the army, even in the midst of this crisis,' said Teresita C. Schaffer, a former U.S. ambassador to Sri Lanka and now director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies' South Asia program in Washington.
Pakistan's fragile state also reflects a long-term quandary for the administration. The military regime ousted a democratically elected government in 1999, one of the main reasons that the United States had shifted its South Asian alliances by distancing itself from Pakistan and warming up to India's democratic government--until the Sept. 11 bombings.
Because Washington now needs Islamabad, Pakistan's military might be able to stay in power--and further defer the promise of returning to democracy. "Up until Sept. 11, it was a near certainty that Pakistan would hold elections next year. That's much less certain now," said Schaffer. Even if they are held, the fairness of elections and the question of who would run--namely military figures--are also now in doubt.
Pakistan is a microcosm of the greatest vulnerability--and conundrum--for U.S. policy as it takes on terrorism.
Islamic activism initially emerged throughout the Muslim world in large part as a political alternative. The more than 50 nations of the so-called Dar al-Islam, or Haven of Islam, make up the last large bloc of countries to hold out against the democratic tide that has swept the rest of the world over the past two decades.
With opposition figures in most of these countries banned, exiled, imprisoned or even executed, Islam has often offered the only viable alternative. Islam is the world's only major monotheistic religion that offers a set of rules by which to govern society, so it has particular legitimacy--and accessibility--to populations struggling to find ways and ideas about how to have a greater say in determining their destinies.
The conundrum is that the United States will be turning to many of the world's least democratic regimes to rout terrorism--and in the process, giving them greater standing and probably even political IOUs, analysts warn. And that will reinforce the very conditions that gave rise to the growth of Islamic militancy.
"There is more to this problem than simply the actions of one man or one group of men who want to oust the U.S. from the gulf. There's a deeper pool of hatred and frustration focused on the U.S. that grows out of the absence of economic and political rights throughout the region," said Ken Pollack, a former National Security Council staffer now at the Council on Foreign Relations. "As part of the longer term solution to this crisis, we'll need to find ways to work with our allies in the region to address those deeper issues, which create the pool of disenfranchised and disillusioned young men willing to take up arms."
Analysts point to countries such as Saudi Arabia and the other oil-rich Gulf sheikdoms as well as Algeria, Egypt and other pro-Western Muslim states.
Saudi Arabia, for example, has serious human rights problems, and no country except Afghanistan has a worse record on women's rights. Yet as one of only three countries that recognize Afghanistan's Taliban and as a country where wealthy individuals have financially aided bin Laden, the Saudis will be an important member of the U.S.-led coalition.
Some Arab and Muslim regimes may also use the U.S. appeal for help to crack down further at home. And down the road, the Bush administration may eventually have to face the consequences of its affiliations. It's a fine line, analysts warn.
"For convenience, we may end up supporting autocrats and authoritarian regimes that have their own agendas," said Paula Newberg, a South Asia expert and consultant to the United Nations.
"We could end up creating new enemies among the very people you want to befriend and potentially create new international dangers among groups that can't get a hearing in their own home."
Said Schaffer, "You can pay a price for success if in success you seek one objective to the exclusion of all others that may also be important to U.S. interests in the region."
By patronizing Pakistan during the war against the 1979-89 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, for example, the United States turned a blind eye to activities that contributed to Islamabad's development of a nuclear arsenal, according to Newberg. Afterward, the United States imposed economic and military sanctions on Pakistan, but the threshold had been crossed and South Asia is the one region where two third-world powers--Pakistan and India--have nuclear weapons beyond the control of the world's major powers.