The folly of quick action in Afghanistan It would be a mistake for the US to undertake a military strike before establishing plans for a transitional Afganistan
By ASHRAF GHANI
The battle of Afghanistan is the Bush administration's to lose. The Afghan population is ready for change. The networks of support from Pakistan that have been the mainstay of the Taliban regime are disrupted. Afghanistan's neighbouring countries and the Arab and Islamic regimes would all be pleased to see a change of regime.
Afghans are poor but have sophisticated notions of legitimacy. Compared with the average American, the average Afghan is keenly interested in world events that affect them and do not miss a single broadcast of the BBC.
Most are disenchanted with the Taliban for its failures to address the well-being of the people, its subordination of the in-ternal needs of the country to external adventurism, and for bringing confrontation with the US.
Having witnessed massive use of force by the Red army and the destruction wrought by a long civil war, Afghans are fearful of anarchy and a new phase of warlordism supported by the US. Should use of force lead to large scale civilian casualties, disruption of the lives of people and a new exodus of the Afghan population to neighbouring countries that do not want them, the disenchantment with the Taliban could easily be turned into sympathy and then support for a new militant movement in the region.
The US administration has two options. It can either deal with the symptoms and the visible symbols of the extremist movement or it can address the underlying causes of terrorism and support forces that would be willing to disrupt and destroy the networks that have turned Afghanistan into a launching pad for isolationist and extremist movements.
Dealing with the symptoms would involve military assaults within days or weeks, funnelling large amounts of money and material to warlords opposed to the Taliban and the creation of alliances with neighbouring regimes that could use the opportunity to deny the aspirations of their own people for democratic change. Such an approach would enmesh the US in a series of very complicated relationships in the region. These relationships could in turn spawn networks that could be turned against the west in the longer term.
A more methodical approach would begin from the premise that the fundamental issue in Afghanistan is the creation of a state that would have legitimacy at home, in the region and internationally. Only a nationalist state would have the capacity and commitment to break and destroy the networks of terror.
There is a significant asset and a central constraint in addressing this issue. In spite of nine years of civil war, no group in the country has asked for the dismemberment of the country. Afghan nationalism is strong and a potential basis for the creation of a stable and legit imate government that would offer a formula for accommodating the aspirations of various linguistic and regional groups. Yet no group or individual commands sufficient legitimacy or has articulated a vision and concrete programme of action to convince the population that their aspirations for peace and prosperity can be addressed.
Forging a methodical approach would require acting on lessons from past US engagement in Afghanistan. First, dealing with Afghanistan cannot be outsourced to one of the governments in the region. The US outsourced the management of the resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan to Pakistan and the current situation is a tragic consequence of that decision.
Second, the US cannot funnel large amounts of money and arms to discredited warlords who are now lining up to offer their services. This approach has been tried and resulted in the destruction of the capital city and the emergence of the Taliban.
Third, an interim Afghan government cannot be cobbled together in a couple of weeks. That was tried and led to the civil war among armed factions that had little unity of purpose or sense of accountability.
Fourth, funnelling resources to political parties or non-governmental organisations that are not willing to be accountable to the people for the use of those resources can only lead to alienation of the population. Adoption of that strategy during the Soviet occupation brought little benefit.
Fifth, the United Nations cannot play a constructive role if it does not receive the full backing of the US. In recent years, there have been several very capable special envoys whose efforts have not succeeded because of the lukewarm support of the US and the opposition of regional governments.
Establishing a legitimate government in Afghanistan requires a multi-pronged approach. To gain the trust of the population, a credible programme for reconstruction of the country has to be offered. This would require assembling the younger group of Afghan technocrats who have gained success in industrialised countries, as well as many agencies that have had the commitment to stay through the course of the events in Afghanistan.
Critical to the success of this effort would be to design mechanisms for accountability and transparency of management of resources to be provided for reconstruction. Pakistan and the neighbouring states should be persuaded to accept and support the creation of a broad-based Afghan nationalist government. The role of the UN special envoy could be enhanced to help establish a transitional government composed of a cross-section of Afghans. This process would only be credible if officials in the US government avoided the temptation of imposing lists drawn on the basis of their personal contacts or insistence on giving Afghanistan's octogenarian former king a decisive role in the process.
Establishment of the transitional government would also require the establishment of an army and a police force. Once these arrangements are in place, the use of military force against Osama bin Laden and the hard core of his Taliban allies could be followed by an orderly process of transfer of power.
The administration has an option. It can act quickly, or wisely. The world prays that wisdom may guide policy.
The writer is adjunct professor of anthropology at Johns Hopkins university, and a former lecturer at Kabul university