The latest data provided by sociologists, according to which the KPRF retains a stable 30-35% of the votes of support, despite a heightened activity of "the party of power" could stump the ruling elite. It would seem that all has already been done - a super-party has been created, a vertical of power built and the oligarchic television done away with. Even Duma portfolios have been taken away from the communists. Meanwhile, as the next parliamentary elections are drawing nearer, the KPRF's positions are steadily strengthening, whereas "the party of power" keeps losing points. Sociologists believe, however, that there is nothing bad about this.
Sociologists think that it is not worth relying too much on myths, including one about the exceptionally strong influence of the communist idea on mass conscience, which have gained wide currency in society. At first glance, the KPRF positions look strong enough: last month, according to the data provided by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Centre (VTsIOM), the KPRF had 13% more supporters than United Russia (in January a mere 2%). The latest events (the scandal over key Duma posts) seemed to inevitably lead to a burst of activity on the part of the communist electorate.
However, for sociologists, this is not as obvious as the KPRF leaders and supporter might think it to be. Dmitry Oreshkin - the leader of the Merkator group incorporating experts from the Russian Academy of Sciences, who do economic, social and regional research, comments on the situation.
"Let us begin with a purely scientific approach. We have been analysing the influence of the so-called administrative resource on the results of regional elections for many years. In the early 1990, the administrative resource was traditionally given to communists, as a rule. Executives in the provinces were striving to do everything to return to the Soviet system.
However, later they realized that in the new conditions they could feel no worse by making business and using their omnipotence in distributing resources. The electorate of 'the party of power' started swelling, correspondingly. In 1999, the administrative resource was mostly working for OVR and Unity, while the KPRF had already descended to the third place," explains Dmitry Oreshkin.
The communists lost the support of the local bureaucracy, however, their aggregate electorate did not shrink as a result. The outflow of administrative votes (according to the data provided by sociologists, it was 11-12%) was made up for by the inflow of free votes, not controlled by the authorities.
Merkator experts claim that this is due to serious geographical changes in the communist electorate which have taken place over the past few years. While earlier, mostly the residents of villages, where elections are still the least free (the wishes of the local authorities are like army orders for voters) voted for the representatives of the communist party, today it is mostly city dwellers who vote for them.
"Another reason for the growth of KPRF support lies in the fact that in the eyes of electors (and this is really so) this organization is turning from a party of the old die-hard officialdom into a party of offended yet socially-active people," believes Dmitry Oreshkin.
However, sociologists are sure that there is nothing for "the party of power" (if one is to understand it as a party of the bureaucracy, which it is) to be afraid of. The communist party leaders are the same executives, who differ little from the representatives of the system bureaucracy. Both like to march in columns, while the ideology of communists has long been so diluted that contains nothing really in opposition to the existing regime: just like other people, communists are doing business, trying to avoid taxes and opposing private property just in words. Even if they win elections, they are sure to reach a compromise with those at the pinnacle of power now. There is no question of whether it will be "Zyuganov party" or "the Putin party" that will win elections: as a people's leader, Gennady Zyuganov suits less than 10% of the population. This means that the communists would get just a relative majority in the Duma.