>Again the issue is one of defining power in such a way that it dissipates it's role in
>explaining human interaction. If I can define love as power, what human capability can I
>not describe in terms of power? The issue was whether love relationships manifest the
>absence of power-over and render the capability of explaining love in terms of power-over
>somewhat silly if the participants in the relationship interpret their behaviour vis a vis
>each without recourse to power in the sense of power-over.
The distinction you make between power-to and power-over seems like nonsense to me.
How is love as a source of power any different from consent as a form of power? Given that in a democracy, state power is rooted in consent. The difference seems to be that, if the love you have for someone is the source of their power over you, the power they have to command you, then you as an individual can cut off that power. Since you as an individual is the source of that power.
In a democratic political state, the people as a whole are the source of the power. They have given it, or at least allowed it to be taken. Again they can, collectively, withdraw remove that power.
But in the meantime, the power of the state over citizens is none the less real merely because the source of the power is the voluntary consent of those over whom the power is exercised.
The same applies to power derived from the love of those over whom the power is exercised.
>
>And you are conflating power-to with power-over and not recognizing the distinction of
>using power as a term to define and power as a term of explanation.
Perhaps. You will have to give me a more convincing explanation as to why I should recognise the relevance of such a distinction.
Bill Bartlett Bracknell Tas