A Question

[/ dave /]

L A Hazard wrote:

> What I am
> looking for is documentation that shows what it would have cost
> a company to obey the law/regulation, what their actual fines - if
> any -  were for breaking it and how it diminished or increased their
> "profits." My goal is to determine how much is myth and what the
> reality is. Any suggestions of where to look, links, references, etc.,
> would be greatly appreciated.

I realize that this isn't exactly the phenomenon you describe above, but
I believe the Ford Pinto (with the exploding gas tank) is often held up
as the archetypal example of corporate cost/benefit analysis run amuck.
Undoubtedly its prominence in the annals of corporate history
conveniently serves to mask other former and ongoing examples of same.
As most people know by now, it was revealed that Ford had worked out
that it would be cheaper to pay a few accidental death claims than it
would be to recall all the Pintos and fix the problem that caused the
fires. A quick Google search even brings up numbers:

"Ford discovered that it would cost $11.00 per vehicle to install rubber
bladders in 11 million Pintos and 1.5 million trucks, totaling $137
million; and it estimated that it would cost only $49.5 million if
instead they paid the compensatory damages of the 360 people they
anticipated would die or be injured in fires resulting from this design flaw."

(from <http://www.mllassociates.com/REMEMBERPINTO.HTM>)

Justin mentioned the Corporate Crime Reporter, which coincidentally
touched on this issue in their column this week (maybe this was what
prompted your question?):

Rotten to the Core
By Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman

Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel are University of Chicago law
professors who believe that, when it comes to making profits, nothing --
not even the law -- should stand in the way. (For almost two decades,
Easterbrook has also been a federal appeals court judge.)

Twenty years ago, writing about antitrust crimes in the Michigan Law
Review, Easterbrook and Fischel, then both professors at the University
of Chicago, wrote that managers not only may, but should, violate the
rules when it is profitable to do so. And it is clear that they believed
that this rule should apply beyond just antitrust.

In a nutshell, this is the Chicago School view of corporate law that has
taken hold over the past 20 years.

Under this view, if a Fed Ex truck needs to double park to make a
delivery -- double park. No problem. Pay the $20 fine.  Just as long as
you are still making money, violate the law.

Or course, when it comes to corporate crime and violence, we aren't
talking about just double parking.

We're talking about fraud, corruption, pollution, price-fixing,
occupational disease, and bribery.

The Chicago School says these are "externalities" and related fines and
penalties should simply be viewed as the "costs of doing business."

We call these activities crimes, and we believe society imposes
penalties for committing these crimes to deter and socially sanction
those who would violate society's proscription.

Lawmakers of both parties are shamelessly portraying Enron and Arthur
Andersen as rotten apples, even though those same lawmakers were just
until recently on the take from both corporations, and doing the dirty
work of defeating laws that would have governed both.

But of course we are not talking about a couple of rotten apples here.

As Easterbrook and Fischel so clearly show, the corporate world is now
governed by an ideology that is rotten to the core. After all, as the
great Chicago professors teach us, it is the duty of managers to violate
the law when it is profitable to do so.

Now, the stink has risen. And slowly, but surely, and hardly noticed, a
counter-Chicago movement in corporate law is bubbling up from law
schools around the country.

At Boston College Law School, Professor Kent Greenfield points out that
it used to be that corporations were created by the state to achieve
specified public goals. The corporation was created to build a canal,
for example. And then it was to go out of business.

If the corporation decided to sell hot dogs instead, it was acting
beyond its powers, and a shareholder or the attorney general could file
an injunction under the "ultra vires" (beyond its powers) doctrine --
forcing the company to drop the dogs.

Then, the states started to compete with each other for more corporate
business -- the infamous race to the bottom. As a part of that race,
states stopped imposing strict limitations on corporate powers.

The corporate lawyers set up Delaware as the Las Vegas of corporate
chartering. And as a result, virtually no corporate activity was beyond
a company's defined activity. Ultra vires was dead, was the common view.


Greenfield steps in and says -- wait a minute -- illegal activity is
still "beyond the power" of corporations. State incorporation statutes
and articles of incorporation almost invariably charter corporations
only for "lawful" purposes.

He wants attorneys general and trial lawyers to look carefully at the
possibility of bringing ultra vires lawsuits against officers and
directors of corporate criminals.

At Washington and Lee University, law professor David Millon says that
underlying the assorted debates over the nature of the corporation are
differences of political opinion.

So, those who see the corporation as a creation of the state do so
because we want to see strong public control.

Those who see in a corporation nexus of private contracts (the Chicago
School) see it that way because they want to defeat public regulation.
(The charter of incorporation is like a birth certificate, and nothing
more, they argue.)

This new breed of corporate law reformers, represented by the likes of
Greenfield, Millon and Lawrence Mitchell of George Washington University
Law School, does not go as far as we would in sending the corporation
back to the public woodshed.

But it is good to note that, after years of bowing in subservience to
the giant corporatists of the Midwest, a handful of law professors are
beginning to agitate against the regressive theories of their Chicago
School colleagues.

Their task is simultaneously difficult and easy. Difficult, because the
Chicago School has been so successful in winning the academic -- and
eventually legal -- debate about what corporations are and how they
should be governed. Easy, because the Chicago School claims are so
extreme that the reformers can win the debate -- or at least
significantly shift the pendulum in the field -- by convincingly arguing
simply that corporations should follow the law.


Russell Mokhiber is editor of the Washington, D.C.-based Corporate Crime
Reporter. Robert Weissman is editor of the Washington, D.C.-based
Multinational Monitor, http://www.essential.org/monitor. They are
co-authors of Corporate Predators: The Hunt for MegaProfits and the
Attack on  Democracy (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1999;
http://www.corporatepredators.org)

(c) Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman

This article is posted at:
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/corp-focus/2002/000105.html



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--

/  dave  /